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Résumé
Depuis la fin des années 1990, un consensus a émergé au sein de la communauté
du développement international autour de la mise en oeuvre de ce que Simon
Maxwell (2001) appelle «The New Poverty Agenda» (NPA). Cet agenda,
conduit par la Banque Mondiale et les Nations Unies, constitue une réponse à
Péchec du modèle néo-libéral quant à la réduction de la pauvreté et la réalisation
d?autres objectifs sociaux. Il s’articule autour des Documents de stratégie pour la
réduction de la pauvreté (DSRP) et des Objectifs de développement pour le
Millénaire (OMD). La rhétorique de cette nouvelle politique de lutte anti-pauvreté
génère une terminologie normative, autour de concepts tels que
«autonomisation », « participation », «appropriation ». Elle énonce une stratégie
alternative qui met l’accent sur une approche participative.
L’hypothèse défendue est qu’à travers le NPA, «l’industrie de développement » —
Banque mondiale en tête - tente de revigorer le régime de l’aide après la crise de
légitimité qu’il a traversé au cours de la dernière décennie. Après avoir analysé les
évolutions discursives et celles de la pratique du développement, nous décrirons
en détails les OMD et leurs objectifs, ainsi que le contenu du DSRP afin de
déterminer s’il y a un changement dans la pratique ou une simple adaptation
organisationnelle, un recyclage de pratiques orthodoxes. Nous démontrerons que
cette nouvelle politique constitue une continuation des anciennes approches et
donc de la manière dont l’industrie du développement aborde la réduction de la
pauvreté. Conséquemment, cette réorientation vers une approche en faveur des
pauvres constitue une adaptation plutôt qu’un véritable apprentissage
organisationnel.
Mots clés : pauvreté, développement, Banque Mondiale, aide
Abstract
A consensus within the development community has emerged engaging donors,
governments, NGOs and civil society organizations in the implementation of what
Simon Maxwell (2001) defines as the New Poverty Agenda (NPA). This new
agenda, dnven by the World Bank and the United Nations, was established in
response to the neo-liberal model’s failure in achieving a significant reduction in
poverty and other social objectives. This agreement is articulated by the U.N.
Millennium Development Goals the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers. The rhetoric surrounding these two policy instruments manifests a
normative terminology, with key concepts such as “empowerment”,
“participation”, “ownership” and “partnership”. It promises an entirely different
way of doing business, focusing on poverty reduction through a participative
approach.
The hypothesis defended in this thesis is ffiat the NPA represents an attempt by
the “development industiy”-headed by the World Bank- to rejuvenate the aid
regime after suffering from a loss of legitimacy during the last decade. Afier
identifying the discursive shifts in development practice over the years, we will
proceed with an in-depth description of the MDGs and their objectives and
analyze the content of the PRSPs in light of detennining whether there has been
any change in practice or simply organizational adaptation, a recycling of
orthodox practices. We conclude the NPA constitutes a continuation of past
development approaches and hence in the way the development industry tackies
poverty reduction. Consequently, this shift towards a pro-poor agenda resuits in
adaptation rather than true organizational learning.
Keywords: poverty, development, aid, World Bank
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Introduction
As early as the 1960s, the international development industiy’ was tackiing
pressing issues of poerty and hunger by ffie means of action plans. Nevertheless,
ffiese packages mostly failed in their attempts to address the core issues of
poverty. At the end of the 20th century the development industiy adopted a new
package and identified poverty reduction as the primaiy objective of their agenda.
The 2001 World Bank Report, Attacking Poverty, consolidated a decade’s
accumulation of development approaches and redefined the shape and foundation
of the standard poverty reduction approach to what Simon Maxwell (2001)
identifies as the New Poverty Agenda (NPA). A consensus on poverty, driven by
ifie primary influential international fmancial institutions (IFIs), was therefore
established in response to the neo-liberal agenda’s failure in achieving a
substantial reduction in poverty reduction and other social objectives.
With the arrivaI of the NPA, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) which
recaptured and repackaged many of the development targets that had been set and
unmet in the last decades. As for the World Bank and IMF, ffiey reformulated
their structural adjustment programs to become Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSP). This new construction of poverty links the PRSPs- a new set of
instruments for delivering aid and results-based management- to the MDGs- a set
of global time-bound goals aimed to reduce poverty.
The MDGs are a commitment adopted by 189 countries at the U.N. Millennium
Summit in September 2000, which establishes a “tirneframe” for achieving
quantitative targets for poverty reduction and improvements in sectors such as
health, education, gender issues and the environment. According to the
Millennium Declaration the objective is to achieve these goals by 2015 in the vast
and diverse countries of “developing” world.
‘Development, once a field engaging people who had a calling, bas become a full fledged industiy,
employing an infinite number of practitioners and experts (professionalization) in nunierous fields and
where development organizations are preoccupied with seif-preservation, giowth and legitimization.(Dichter, 2003).
6The MDGs have been widely accepted and encouraged by international
development and donor agencies. According to the development community,
ffiese goals are well defmed and measurable, therefore mobilizing a great deal of
support from donors. They affirm that these targets represent a consensus in the
sustainable development agenda and promote strong donor coordination.
On the other hand, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, adopted in 1999 by the
World Bank and the IMF, is viewed as being an ambitious commitment to poverty
reduction. PRSPs are meant to replace Structural Adjustment Programs as the new
pre-condition for bans and debt relief. PRSPs are a formai requirement for
developing countries seeldng assistance tbrough the HeaviÏy Indebted Poor
Counti-ies Initiative (HIPC) or concessional lending from the World Bank. Their
main focus is to ensure that resources that are released for debt relief are allocated
and invested for poverty reduction.
Moreover, they allegediy represent a rupture with traditional conditionality and
are based on the concept of parmership and recipient country ownership of
development programs. According to some of the principal actors of the
deveiopment industry (ex. World Bank and U.N.), PRSPs provide a key
opportunity for mobilizing national actors towards the achievement of the MDGs.
furthermore, the PR$Ps have become the principal framework for all donor
lending and the main methodology for developing national strategies for
achieving poverty reduction.
We chose to focus our analysis on these two important policy instruments (the
MDGs and the PRSPs) due to their current popuiarity within the development
community and more importantly, the seductive rhetoric around them. This
rhetoric promises an entirely different way of doing business, focusing on poverty
reduction through the participation of civil society. Furthermore, the MDGs and
PRSPs encode the alleged consensus in a linear logic (Comwall and Brock 2005)
and represent a clear articulation of the New Poverty Agenda.
7Research problem and question
Arturo Escobar (1995) daims that today’s global conceptualizations of poverty
were conceived early in the post-second world war period and Ïater gained
prominence among the international community as it was understood that world
poverty and inequality were a great menace to global stability. from the
beginning, poverty was defined as a deficiency of money and material possessions
and the panacea identified was economic growth and increased incomes facilitated
by extemal development assistance and the implementation of macro-economic
prescriptions such as liberalization. Poverty reduction was assumed to follow tins
process naturally (Storey and al 2005). This solution was presented as the
universal truth by global development agencies such as the World Bank. It was
around tins premise that development discourse and practice would be based. The
World Bank took on the role of guaranteeing the reproduction and suwival of this
neo-liberal agenda.
According to ifie leading agencies of the development industry, the New Poverty
Agenda represents a break with past approaches and constitutes a new rationale
for aid and development based on parmerships towards a common and realistic
objective- poverty reduction. The leading actors daim that the concept of poverty
has been broadened beyond the notions of inadequate income and consumption
towards a more comprehensive perspective.
Furthermore, the NPA is also based on the shared understanding that the
elimination of poverty can only 5e realized through the engagement of the “poor”
in development processes. It is based on the belief that poverty reduction requires
coherent collaboration and partnership among a large variety of actors, such as
development agencies, recipient govemments, civil society organizations and the
private sector.
Nevertheless, numerous critics and sceptics (ex. Brock Comwall and Gaventa
2001; Storey, Bulloch and Overton 2005) have underlined the never-ending
problems with poverty policy-making and the lack of change in practice. For
many CSO and researchers within the field, there is no new agenda; the new focus
8on poverty merely constitutes a different path to the same ends of political reform
and economic adjustment (Storey, Bullocli Overton, 2005).
The MDGs are constmed as being an innovative attempt to alleviate poverty and
promote sustainable developrnent. However, time-bound objectives and specific
goal setting is flot really new in development. Even though the MDGs contain
various novelties, many fear that these goals end up being a mere continuation of
the development industry conceiving action plans that demand they assist
countries in direct ways and inject money to achieve measurable results. The
tendency of doing things directly is inherently linked to the imperatives that have
corne to dictate development organizations’ actions (Dichter 2003).
On the other hand, the PRSPs are lauded for their potential in increasing aid
effectiveness, donor coordination and poverty reduction ffirougli participatory
policy-making. However, rnany fear that this new policy instrument constitutes a
mere repackaging of the structural adjustment agenda. They question the
underlying interests and motivations of the World Bank, whicli has now becorne
the largest “for profit” organization in the business ofpoverty reduction.
One cannot deny that poverty reduction lias become the essential focus of
development agencies over the past decade. A consensus among key developrnent
organizations has emerged engaging governments, rnultilateral aid agencies and
NGOs on the poverty bandwagon. Agreement about the importance of focusing
on poverty through a participative approach is exemplified by the adoption of
poverty objectives such as the Millennium Development Goals and policy
instruments such as the PRSPs. This new “fad” can be partly explained by the loss
of legitirnacy of the raison d’être of aid and the fatigue that has ernerged in
consequence. However, division among donors and recipient countries stiil
remains about what causes poverty and the means of reducing it. Consequently,
the coherence of this new poverty approacli is not evident in practice.
furtherrnore, it is important to underline that the developrnent agenda is and bas
been determined by global actors (Storey and al 2005, p.3 1). Development
practice has shown that policy does not necessarily react to the interests of
traditional bilateral recipients or “partner countries”, but to the influential
9multilateral institutions2 (World Bank and United Nations) that prescribe and
adopt development action plans (Brock, Cornwall and Gaventa 2001). In terms
of designing development policy, NGO’s, bilateral donors and recipient
governments are policy-takers rather than policy-makers.
Hence, as the development industry experiences a shift towards a poverty focus
driven by Northern donors and Northern-aligned multilateral institutions-we must
question if this evolution translates into the adoption of development programs
based on recipient countries’ national priorities, defined intemally. Today’s
development rhetoric contains an extremely normative terminology, with concepts
such as poverty reduction, participation, ownership and partnership occupying an
important place within discourse. However, lias their use translated into a
substantial change in the policies pursued in practice by mainstream
development? Does the NPA compete with recipient governments’ own policies
or is it inspired by these? While poverty reduction has taken center stage, have
leading donors made significant changes in development practice? Furthermore,
does the New Poverty Agenda, more specifically the PRSPs, represent a rupture
from orthodox neo-liberal agendas of the past which have failed to tackle the
structural causes of poverty in a sustainable manner? In sum, the question we aim
to answer is whether the MDGs and PRSPs constitute a breakthrough in the
manner that development organizations, such as the World Bank and the U.N.,
tackie poverty?
Hypothesis
Our hypothesis is that the NPA and the operational frameworks which constitute it
(the MDGs and the PRSPS) represent a response to the mounting criticism from
outside and inside the industiy and an attempt by the development community
headed by the World Bank- to rejuvenate the aid system which has suffered from
fatigue and a loss of legitimacy in the last decade. We believe that this new focus
on poverty reduction, which is fmely articulated by the MDGs ami the PRSPs,
constitutes a continuation of past development approaches and hence in the way
2 Consequendy, this master’s thesis will focus primarily on World Bank policies and secondly, on UNkey policy statements and action plans.
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the development industry tackies poverty reduction. Consequently, this shift
towards a pro-poor agenda resuits in organizational adaptation rather than
leaming.
Literature Review and Methodology
This literature review will demonstrate that writers either welcome the MDGs and
the PRSPs because they represent change or they discard them for thefr
continuity. The different authors and actors that have expressed their opinions
and views on the subject can therefore be classified into two categories: those who
believe that the NPA and its instruments constitute a change in development
paradigm and practice and those who view them as being a simple continuation of
past approaches.
The first consider the MDGs and PRSPs to be an enormous advance in the
development community’s understanding of the characteristics of poverty and the
poor, the logic of poverty measurements and underlying economic dynamics.
Jeffrey $achs (Special Advisor to the U.N. Secretary General on the MDGs)
praises and firmly defends the potential and promises that the MDGs represent. In
his book, The End ofPoverty, Jeffrey Sachs states:
“The Millennium Development Goals wisely recognize that extreme poverty has
many dimensions, flot only low-income, but also vulnerability to disease,
exclusion from education, chronic hunger, and undemutrition, lack of access to
basic amenities such as clean water and sanitation, and environmental
degradatjon such as deforestation and land erosion that threatens lives and
livelihoods.” (Sachs 2005, 213)
According to Sachs, the end of extreme poverty is within reach, and achieving the
Goals will lead us close to that target.
Sakiko fukuda Parr daims that the Goals constitute a shift away from growth as
the primary goal of the development endeavor. According to Parr,
• .the goals put human development-poverty and people and their lives- at the
center of the global development agenda for the new millennium...
.MDGs are flot just aspirations, but provide a framework for accountability. .
(Fukuda Parr 2004, 1)
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Fukuda also highlights that the Goals are the first to address inputs from high
income countries, therefore creating a compact ifiat holds both “rich” and “poor”
equally accountable.
Ruth Driscoil and Alison Evans (2004) suggest that expenence with the first
generation of PRSs lias proven to achieve important progress in three key areas. It
lias contributed to a much stronger focus on poverty by national recipient
govemments; it has engaged civil society in poverty policy debates on an
unprecedented scale; and fmally, it has focused attention on donor alignment and
harmonisation internationally as well as at a the country level.
According to the previous World Bank President, James Wolfensohn (199$), in
today’s development discourse there is littie talk about macro-economic theory in
the traditional sense. His 2000/0 1 World Development Report (WDR) sustains
that there has been a “complete flip around” during the l990s in the World Bank’s
approach to development (Kanbur and Vines 2000, 95). The World Bank defends
the PRSPs as being an innovative and participative approach to poverty reduction
that involves multiple actors including civil society.
On the other hand, ifiere are ifie sceptics and critics who daim that the NPA and
its instrnments do flot constitute a significant shift away from the predominant
neo-liberal ideology in theoiy or in practice. The NPA is viewed instead as a
“process of hybridization” where alternative concepts have been appropnated by
the primaiy development institutions and integrated into mainstream (Storey,
Bulloch and Overton 2005, 35). These cntics argue that the fundamental elements
of the NPA remain orthodox and are not challenged by their association to the
alternative.
Donovan Storey, Hannah Bulloch and John Overton (2005) believe that the New
Poverty Agenda in its present form constitutes a “missed opportunity” in terms of
ameliorating development assistance and the relationship between actors. They
daim that the primary global agendas such as globalization and structural
adjustment remain intact despite this new focus on poverty reduction.
Furthermore, they affimi that PRSPs, instead of completely breaking with
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traditional conditionality, have merely adopted another form. They add that the
MDGs do flot represent a break with past practice and conclude that:
“The NPA is a trend, emanating from the major multilateral institutions and
adopted by overseas developrnent agencies in a ‘follow the leader’ fashion
(D.Storey and al. 2005, 42).”
Andrea Comwall and Karen Brock (2005) assert that even though the New
Poverty Agenda has adopted a bighly normative discourse wiffi tenns such as pro
poor, participation, empowerment, partnership and ownership, technical
prescriptions for attaining growth such as liberalization stili dommate discourse
and practice. They daim:
“...the World Bank reshaped its existing narratives to make them more palatable
to an increasingly critical international community.. .“ (Brock and al. 2001, 8)
Most of the managerial iiterature3 available evaluates the achievability and the
costs of the Millennium Development Goals but few analyze their underlying
framework. The majority of practitioners who have written articles and books on
the MDGs have failed to question whether they actuaiiy tacide the structural
causes of poverty. Moreover, most documentation available on the PRSPs fails to
address issues such as the politics of participation and the implications of donor
coordination for low-income countries. In sum, the literature review demonstrated
that in general, the authors and practitioners have not been scientifically rigorous
in their method or in the conceptual framework chosen for their analysis.
The meffiod employed in this thesis will consist in performing a diachronic
analysis of past and present development policies and frameworks in order to
establish whether or flot the NPA constitutes a break or continuation of
development approaches and practice. We will situate this new rhetoric by
focusing on the two frames of reference for development intervention that have
gained undisputed currency in recent years: the MDGs and the PRSPs. We will
draw substantially on officiai World Bank Reports, UNDP documentation and
other managerial texts and on publications and papers prepared by the key
development agencies associated and influenced by the alleged shift in
Refers to the documents and policy papers published by development organizations such as theWorld Bank the UN and the 010).
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development discourse and policy4. We will then analyze to what extent these
policy/discourse shifts have been operationalized in practice. The objective of this
master’s thesis is to analyze these two policy instruments in view of establishing
whether or not their underlying nonnative rhetoric translates into genuine change
or a continuation of the status quo. We will evaluate what is being done in the
name of poverty reduction, participation and ownership in practice, by taking a
comprehensive look at the MDGs and PR$Ps and verifying to what extent these
instruments represent real change in practice or simply an appropriation of a
normative and moral rhetoric in an attempt to mask “business as usual”.
Overview of chapters
In the chapter that follows (Chapter 1: Methodology and Conceptual Framework),
we sketch out the method(s) employed throughout this master’s thesis in order to
prove or disprove the hypothesis stated above. Firstly, we will describe in detail
the methodological approach chosen that will allow us to establish if the NPA and
its two primary instruments constitute an element of change or continuity.
Secondly, we will identif’ and define our conceptual framework and explain how
it will help us evaluate, from a theoretical point of view, whether or not we are
witness to a new paradigm and a breakthrough in development practice.
In Chapter 2 (History of Past Approaches), we identify and analyze the discursive
shifts and evolutions in developmcnt practice that have brought us to where we
are now. In this chapter, the question of change is addressed by detailing the shifts
in content of the World Bank’s policy/discourse and the U.N. developrnent action
plans and agendas over the last 50 years. These shifts will be contextualized
through the identification of the policy and economic developments that had an
important impact on the development agenda. This exercise will help us
comprehend the context in which the NPA has cmerged.
In Chapter 3 our attention tums to the analysis of the Millennium Development
Goals. We will begin with an in-depth description of the MDGs and their
objectives. Furthermore, wc will identify their origin(s), the elements that have
It is important to emphasize that we focus on the shiit in World Bank and secondly UN policy and
discourse.
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inspired this new global consensus and familiarize ourselves with their underlymg
facts. Then we will put to question the primary characteristics of the IVIDGs
valued by some and denounced by others. This chapter’s ultimate objective is to
determine whether or not the MDGs constimte a new way of tackiing poverty
reduction.
Finally, in Chapter 4 our focus wffl tum to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.
We will analyze the content of the PR$Ps with the purpose of determining if there
has been any change in practice or if structural adjustment been merely
camouflaged and repackaged. We will evaluate the implications of the PRSP’ s
emphasis on aid effectiveness and donor coordination for low-income countries
and firially, we will address the politics of participation, which constitute a central
foundation of this new instrument. Our objective is to explore if the PRSPs have
the potential of changing the way the development industry tackies poverty.
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Chapter 1: Methodology and Conceptual Framework
Methodology
In this master’s thesis, we will engage in an inductive study of the New Poverty
Agenda by analyzing two of its primary policy instruments or frameworks: the
Millennium Development Goals and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The
research method employed will be a qualitative and diachronie analysis through
literature and documentation review. We will compare past and present
managerial documentation, officiai publications and policy papers produced by
the major development agencies such as the United Nations Development
Program and the World Bank. We choose to focus on these two institutions
because they have dominated the content of development discourse5 and practice
over the past fifiy years, through their financial leverage and or development
knowledge and expertise. Furthermore, their influence and power have compelled
most of the organizations within the development industry to adopt their
theoretical discourse and practices. We will identify the similanties and
differences between their past and present development action plans and
approaches and evaluate the current general tendency in order to venfy if today’s
“New Poverty Agenda” consfitutes change or continuity in the development
industty’s method of tackiing poverty.
We wili pay particular attention to PRSP and MDG reports and concerning
documents. Since the Millenuium Development Goals and the PRSPs have
become increasingly popular in the last decade, international development
agencies, NGOs and national development think-tanks offer a large amount of
documentation on the subject. We will analyze this managerial literature. Through
an analysis of the rhetoric present in this documentation, we hope to obtain
empirical data necessary in order to compare discourse, strategies and programs.
By discourse we mean the “ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning
is given to phenomena”. (Hajer 1993, 45). According to foucault (1979), discourses are “tactical
elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations; there can exist different and even
contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without
changing their form ftom one strategy to another, opposing strategy (pp.lO 1-102).
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They will provide us with the variables and indicators that are embodied in
development policies and poverty reduction strategies prescribed by the major
development organizations. They will also heip us identify the gaps between
rhetoric and practice.
Managerial documents
First of ail, we can tum to the World Bank, the main development agency and
fmancial institution, which has and continues to dominate development discourse
and set the agenda. One can refer to the World Bank’s website,
www.worldbank.org, which provides practical infonnation on the MDGs and the
PRSPs. The Organization gives public access to national Poverty Reduction
Papers, the PRSP sourcebook, Policy Research Papers, and Working Papers on
issues concerning the achievement of the MDGs and poverty alleviation. Sectoral
research papers, data on progress achieved and capacity building efforts are also
available on the website. The Bank’s website also has a webpage named Poverty
Net, which is considered a valuable source for researchers and practitioners,
offering documents on poverty measurement, monitoring analysis and on PRSPs.
Furthermore, the Comprehensive Development framework (CDF)6 Secretanat
provides information on how the World Bank is enhancing country ownership
through PRSPs and working towards the achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals.
Among other informational resources available from within the development
industry one will find numerous documents provided by the United Nations. The
U.N. has dedicated an entire section of its website to the Millennium
Development Goals: www.un.org/rnillenniumgoals/. This page offers information
on themes such as the status of the MDGs in world regions, statistics on each goal
and information on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration. In
addition, the U.N. Secretary-General Koffi Annan and former U.N. Development
6 The CDF, considered a hotistic approach to development, was developed by the World Bank
after the failure of SAP. According to the Bank, the CDF is flot based on conditionality, but onpartnership between itsetf, assuming the repositioned role of”Knowledge Bank” and the recipientgovemments who allegedly have full ownership ofthe policies they choose to pursue (Pender
2001, 397).
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Program (UNDP) Administrator, Mark Malloch Brown have launched the
Millennium Project, www.millenniumproject.org, mandated to identify the best
strategies for achieving the MDGs. The Millennium Project is directed by Jeffrey
Sachs, who serves as Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the MDGs. The
Millenrnum Project’s research aims to underline ffie operational prionties,
organizational means of implementation and the financial resources needed to
accomplish the Goals. Moreover, the United Nations Development Group
(UNDG), www.undg.org, created in 1997, designs policies and procedures that
facilitate the coordination of UN member agencies’ efforts around poverty
reduction. Member agencies work together and analyze country issues, plan and
implement support programmes and strategies, and monitor resuits. These
initiatives aim to increase UN impact in helping countries achieve the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). The website offers documents and publications
focusing on the importance of rendenng the MDGs operational, localizing the
Goals and harmonizing development efforts towards their achievement. The
United Nations Development Program has also created a webpage for issues
surrounding the MDGs: www.undp.org/mdg/. The UNDP website offers country
assessments, MDG Reports (prepared by various developing countries) and other
documents pertaining to national development frameworks for attaining the Goals.
It also publicizes reports that chart progress towards reaching the goals, in
cooperation with other UN agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetaiy
Fund, civil society and other partners.
One can also refer to the OECD website, www.oecd.org which constitutes a
valuable resource for analyzing mainstream rhetoric on poverty reduction. The
website includes policy briefs, case studies, working papers and other publications
pertaining to the MDGs and the PRSPs. For example, the OECD’s DAC Network
on Poverty Reduction (POVNET), which was launched in 1998, offers various
documents offering policy guidance and aiming to help bilateral donors strengthen
the impact of their poverty reduction efforts.
finally, publications from numerous international development think tanks will
help build and develop the theoretical foundation of the research question. They
offer a critical analysis of the variables to be studied throughout this thesis. First,
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there is the Overseas Development Instimte (ODI), Great Britain’s leading
independent think tank on international development issues such as PRSPs,
inequality and social exclusion, globalization in trade and finance, and the reform
of global governance (www.odi.org.uk ). We referred to the numerous ODI
publications, specifically the Development Policy Review, a journal which
establishes valuable links between research and policy in international
development. $econdly, there is the Instimte for Environment and Development,
an international policy research center that offers publications on themes
surrounding poverty reduction and sustainable development (www.iied.org). The
Institute publishes articles on topics such as the MDGs, participation and global
governance. There is also the French think tank on economic development, DIAL
(Development, Institutions and Long Tenn Analysis) which was created in
partnership with the French Development Agency (AfD) and the Institute for
Development Research (IDR) (www.dial.prd.fr ). This Institute published an
important book on the PRSPs, New International Poverty Reduction Strategies
which offers an extensive and critical analysis of the poverty reduction strategies
and higfflights its main innovations. They have also published books on debt
relief, the aid fatigue, and globalization. finally, we must mention the Third
World Quarterty (TWQ) an academic journal of policy in the field of international
devetopment studies. Ibis journal provides an alternative, comprehensive,
reflective analysis on crucial issues surrounding poverty reduction and has
published various articles on the implications of the New Poverty Agenda
(www.tandf.co.uk).
Variables, causal relationshfp, and indicators
As stated earlier, a comparative analysis of past and present discourse wlll help us
identify the ideological stand of development organizations over the years. A
shift of ideas will imply a change in discourse. The program or action plan will
facilitate the implementation of the strategies and the achievement of the
objectives identified within the discourse. A change in discourse should result in
the adoption of new programs. The implementation of new programs should
translate into a change in practice. However, this is not always the case. If practice
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remains unchanged, there has not been genuine change and one is probably
witness to organizational adaptation or status quo.
Indicators
We have identified a certain number of preliminary indicators that will help us
evaluate whether or not the NPA constitutes a genuine change in development
practice and discourse:
Box 1: Indicators
• Presence of conditionalities
• Agenda’s focus on redistribution, equality and structural causes ofpoverty
• Presence of macroeconomic prescriptions for growth (ex. liberalization,
privatization etc.)
• Emphasis on income and consumption, the use of GDP as a predominant
indicator ofprogress in poverty reduction
• Input of national recipient govemments vs. input of donors or
development agencies
• Input of new actors: civil society vs. input of national govemments
Conceptual Framework
Our conceptual framework includes two theoretical sources. On one hand, we will
refer to constructivist works drawing from the sociological organizational theory
(Lewis 2003, Leiteritz and Weaver 2005) in order to fiuly understand the process
of change within major multilateral development organizations which embody the
‘poverty alleviation industry”7 such as the World Bank and the United Nations
specialized agencies. On another hand, we will make reference to the post
development antbropological theory defended by multiple authors such as
Escobar and Ferguson. This approach wilÏ provide us with another angle for
cnticalÏy analyzing the different variables and indicators. These two theoretical
frameworks will help us understand the technocratic and political logics behind
A term borrowed from Thomas Dichter (2003).
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poverty reduction and deveiopment agendas. Recent publications in
organizational and post-development theory provide us with elements and tools
for understanding past and present development practices and the outcomes that
resuit from their operations. They represent a creative opportunity for advancing
our comprehension in regards to the “development industry’s” true objectives,
ideologies and the organizational imperatives that expiain why organizations
involved in the business of poverty reduction behave the way they do.
furthermore, this method will allow us to verify if today’s New Poverty Agenda
constitutes a breakthrough in development practice or a continuation of past
approaches.
Post-development theory
The post-development theory is a “radical reaction to the dilemmas of
development” (Pieterse 2000, 175). Post-developmentalists such as Arturo
Escobar, Gustavo Esteva, James Ferguson, Serge Latouche, Gilbert Rist and
Vandana Shiva sustain that development must be discarded and done away with
on account of its mediocre resuits and most importantly, its underlying intentions.
Unhke mainstream development theories such as “basic needs” and sustainable
development, this theoretical approach constitutes an absolute rejection of the
development paradigm (Siemiatycki, 2005).
Jan Nederveen Pieterse, like many others, considers importations of post
stmcturalist perspectives as the origin of the post-development theory. A post
stmcturalist analysis of development centers on understanding the concept as a
discourse or a system of knowiedge, techniques, practices and power relationships
that regulate the objects of development. This analysis consists of a meticulous
and careful scrutiny of language as a framework of presuppositions and structures
of thought (Pieterse, 2000, p.1 80). Managerial texts such as planning documents,
strategic frameworks, sector reports and project documents are analyzed with the
objective of identifying the ways in which the language and terminology used in
these texts establish a certain way of thinking and viewing development, while
excluding others (Lewis, Bebbington, Batterbuiy, Shah, Oison, Siddiqi and DuvalI
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2003). Post-developmentalists use this methodology to argue that development
discourse sustains and reproduces unequal power relations.
For some time now, anthropologists such as Arturo Escobar have provided
academic circles with an ethnographie perspective to the development endeavor.
Those dedicated to studying development issues have produced numerous
publications on power, history and agency within orgauizations by analyzing
development as a discourse (ex. Escobar 1994, Ferguson 1994). Previously, their
studies were centered on the “objects’ of development, but today they also focus
on development organizations and interventions themselves. The pnmaly object
of research within these studies has been the World Bank due to its influence in
the production of development knowledge.
A post-stnictural analysis of development also challenges the preconceived
notions about how and why development organizations operate the way they do,
unveiling their true objectives and survival instincts. They also reftect on
relationships of power that surround development organizations and their
practices and the way in which they end up bypassing their alleged mandate of
empowering populations. Power is central to these analyses; it is impossible to
adequately conceptualize organizational culture and behavior without reflecting
on the power relations within organizations and between them and other actors
and stakeholders (Lewis and al. 2003). While analyzing the repercussions of the
industry’s practices one uncovers the system of power relationships that exists
between actors that characterize the development endeavor.
Post-development writings from authors such as Ferguson and Escobar have
analyzed development as a discourse. In lames Ferguson’s book, The Anti
potitics Machine: “Devetopment,” Depoliticizalion and Bureaucratic Power in
Lesotho the author analyzes project documents as texts with the objective of
demonstrating how language and concepts privilege a certain way of thinldng by
limiting offiers. He classifies literature on the development industiy into two
types. The first stream of literature concentrates on managing development to
make it more efficientleffective. Most of this research is produced from within
the industry, in development agencies by practitioners. It views the development
22
endeavor as an instrument at ffie disposai of the “expert”. Development is
therefore conceived as being a technical tool that can produce the desfred anti
poverty and pro-growth resuits if the right combination of inputs is selected. The
second type of literature views development as being a political, anti-democratic,
ethnocentric project of exploitation of the “Third World”. As one can observe, the
technocratie logic favors professional expertise and management, economic
growth and bureaucracies that generate quick measurable resuits. The other
denounces development initiatives for being externally imposed, top-down
interventions, rejecting the concept of development altogether.
Moreover, the post-development theoiy aims to clarify how meanings and
concepts associated with development are produced, questioned and modified in
practice. These texts have also shed light on how international, national and local
development bureaucracies operate and how their practices lead to significant
gaps between development goals as presented in policy documents and the goals
pursued in operational practice and inftuenced by bureaucrats’ personal interests
(D. Lewis and al. 2003).
Sociological organization ffieory
The sociological organization theoiy analyzes the nature of the organizations
agency, in other words the culture that explains behavioral outcomes and
processes of change. Tins approach studies the interaction of endogenous and
exogenous factors that generate power and influence the policies of international
organizations such as the Bank and the UN. It supports the notion that
organizations develop and evolve into social actors acquiring interests and a
behavior that ensures their survival and reproduction.
The theory suggests that organizations attempt to reach their objectives in
competitive environments by creating formai structures and technologies and
consti-ucting their own organizational culture (Leiteritz and al. 2005). Within
organizations, or in tins case development agencies, culture evolves very sÏowly
over time or is strategically orchestrated by bureaucrats as a means of dealing
with crises (Leiteritz and al. 2005). Furthermore, important, external non-state
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actors can have a strong impact on the development industiy and its most
important institutions by affecting their normative and competitive environment.
Organizational culture constitutes a determining variable which iuforms members
on how to respond to changes in this environment.
Organizational culture can therefore be defined as:
“the ideologies, norms and routines goveming the expectations and behavior of
the bureaucratic staff, as well as the organization’s relationship with its extemal
environment’ (Leiteritz and al. 2005, 3).
Changing the organizational culture of an institution such as the World Bank or
the UN can be a lengthy and higffly complex process. If the values, beliefs and
norms are strong, the process of change will be even more difficuit.
Organizational change therefore requires an important shift in the organization’s
ideologies, shared norms, values etc., a process which has proved to be inherently
slow. These imperatives and culture constitute the elements that stir change in a
slow manner and produce outcomes that do flot always coincide wiffi the interests
of the actors that are inside and outside the industry. Proposed reforms to
organizational culture may produce resistance and hostility, especially from those
who benefit from the status quo. Institutional change will therefore most likely
occur when the proposed reforms converge with the existing organizational norms
and do not challenge existing ideologies.
The outcomes of reform efforts within organizations, in this case the primary
organizations that make up the development industry, can be classified as
learning, adaptation or status quo. Leaming can be defined as the process through
winch values, ideologies, norms, language and routines are questioned and
targeted for change (Leiteritz and al. 2005, 9). When learning is involved, the
organizational behavior changes as intemal actors question their values, policies
programs and agendas.
On the other hand there is adaptation, winch constitutes a process through winch
the organization experiences modifications in its behavior as its actors add on new
programs without necessarily dropping old ones or changing their underlying
culture (Haas 1990). Reforms that demand small adaptations in the organization’s
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underlying culture are more likely to succeed than radical reforms that attempt to
alter their existing iogic and behavior. Adaptation processes are reflected through
the organization’s response in dealing with new problems or cntics. The
organization usually develops new programs and agendas in an attempt to
dissolve external pressure and advocacy, without questioning their coherence and
sustainability. It is important to point out that these new programs or agendas are
nevertheless consistent and coherent wiffi the organization’s existing ideas, norms,
values and do not go against its operating procedures.
Finally, the iast possible outcome is status quo, where the organization refuses to
adapt, even less leam, because programs and agendas are at odds with its
organizational culture. In this case, culture is very resistant, due to the
organization’s aftempt to protect traditional ideologies, norrns and the internai
management of its operations. A qualitative shift in organizationai behavior is
therefore completely absent.
Constrnctivist applications of the sociological concept of organizational culture
also maintain that reform within powerful and influential international
development agencies sucli as the UN and the World Bank depend on a
“convergence” of external and intemal factors. For example, changes in the
national interests of the principal member states or shareholders, in addition to
paradigm shifis in the general international development regime and massive
protests from NGOs and civil society organizations have ail amounted to an
external demand for change and reform, but with diverging and conflicting ideas
on desired outcomes.
Important changes in the development industiy’s external normative and
competitive environment throughout the last decades have increased pressures for
reform. The principal catalyst of reform has been the changing interests of donor
countnes winch collectively detain the power to influence major organizations
(World Bank, UN) activities. Concem over loss of ODA legitimacy, stemming
from waning public support, pushed donor govemments to cut back their
development assistance flows and focus on increasing aid effectiveness through
results-based management approach.
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On the other hand, one can point out the proliferatmg number of international
development organizations such as regional, bilateral development banks and
other aid agencies offering development assistance and diminishing the
dependence on Bank ffinds. These increasing numbers of agencies have had an
impact on the competitive environment of the World Bank and have pushed the
Organization to focus on aid coordination. Furthermore, the Institution has been
forced to adapt to this changing environment by redefming its development
agenda and lending modalities.
Furthermore, there are very important non-state actors that also play a role as
catalysts of change. For example, there are numerous watchdog and advocacy
groups that closeÏy observe ifie actions of the principal players of the development
industry. These international, national, local non-govemmental and civil society
organizations have tom away the legitimacy of institutions such as the World
Bank by documenting and publicizing the devastating social effects of programs
such as structural adjustment (Leitentz and al. 2005)
finally, one could also point out the exogenous impact of scholars who have not
ceased to criticize the dominant neo-liberaï economic heterodoxy pushed forward
by the Washington Consensus and defended within the development industry. The
well-lmown failure of structural adjustment programs in achieving sustainable
poverty reduction and growth also fuelled this extemal pressure. This loss of
legitimacy put institutions such as the World Bank in a delicate position, as they
risked losing their leadership role and credibility. Moreover, progressive theories,
focusing on the social and environmental dimensions of development were
gaining importance, consequently pushing the World Bank to evaluate its rhetoric
and commitrnent to poverty reduction. This also resulted in an increasing demand
for more participative approaches to designing and implementing development
strategies. Henceforth, the Bank has been pressured into adopting a large number
of “new” agendas devoted to participatory and sustainable development that have
pushed the Institution to commit to consultations with NGOs, and local CSOs.
The effect of this rapidly changing normative environment has been the
emergence of a series of new development issues (participation, partnership,
accountability, empowerment etc), which challenge the traditional macro-
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economic focus, apolitical and technocratic rationality characterizing the World
Bank and other major development agencies.
Nevertheless, there are internai constraints that limit the impact and influence of
external factors and therefore hinder reform efforts. Organizational culture affects
the manner in which environmental demands are understood and translated into
policy agendas and development strategies. Development agencies such as the
World Bank have to deal with extemal requirements for survival and reproduction
as well as ensuring their internal integration winch guarantees their efficiency.
As stated earlier, reform is much casier when it does flot imply disruptions in the
ideologies, nonns and values of the organization. Today’s demands for the
industry to become more poverty-focused, accountable and dependent on
participatory processes, fundamentally challenges much of its existing culture if
implemented in practice. These objectives could threaten the economic,
technocratic, apolitical rationality that dominates the organizational culture of
Institutions such as the World Bank.
Figure 1: Change in International Organizations (Leiteritz and aI. 2005, 11)
External Environment Inside the Organization Outcomes
In sum, this theoretical framework wili allow us to evaluate whether the
development industiy is capable of going beyond its economic imperatives and
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produce real change. Are we witness te a break with the neo-liberal economic
heterodoxy present in past and present development approaches? In sum, we hope
to verify whether the development industry’s pro-poor refonn efforts are a
continuation of the status quo, or whether they have led to adaptation or leaming.
This conceptual framework will provide a point of reference when evaluating
whether the New Poverty Agenda constitutes a meaningful shift in development
discourse and practice and true organizational change and learning within the
development industry.
2$
Chapter 2: The Evolution of the development industry’s approach
on poverty reducfion
Introduction
A new shift in development discourse seems to have occurred and the New
Poverty Agenda (NPA) serves as ifie concrete articulation of this rhetoric. As
exemplified by tbe Milleimium Development Goals (MDG) and the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), poverty reduction lias once again taken center
stage on the international development agenda. Emphasis no longer lies
exclusively on economic growth but includes a more comprehensive set of social
and environmental objectives surrounding development.
Neverffieless, poverty lias flot aiways been the industiy’s primary preoccupation;
it bas had other pnorities over the decades, including economic growth and
industrialization. Different theories and approaches to development have emerged
over the years, but bas development practice really changed? Is development
being reinvented or merely repackaged? Is the New Poverty Agenda part of this
repackaging?
b fiuly understand the implications of the New Poverty Agenda, specffically the
MDGs and the PRSPs, we must look back at the past approaches and poverty
related strategies that preceded them. This historical evaluation will help us
understand why poverty alleviation has become the central objective and theme of
today’s development agenda. This will also help us comprehend how and why the
MDGs and the PRSPs emerged and have become the new trend witbin the
development community. Hence, we will start by taking a brief glance at the
multiple approaches that have been employed and have influenced development
discourse over the last fifty years. Finally, we will study the present context in
which the NPA has risen in hopes of answering the question of whether or flot it
constitutes a break or a continuation in development tbinking and rhetoric.
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The trickle-down era (1951-1960)
In the 1950s the Cold War became a major driver of the development
establishment by giving countries situated between the West and the East the
status of the “third world”. It is in this political atmosphere that President
Trnman’s 1949 Point Four Program emerged on the international scene.
According to Thomas Dichter, Point Four was an important pillar in development
history because for the first time development was seen as a “program” (Dichter
2004). Development had rapidly become an “organizing concept” and the object
of a new problematization (Escobar 1995, 24). In addition, it is important to point
out that for the first time matenal growth coincided with economic development,
making per capita income the measuring tool for development.
At this point, development was afready envisaged as an engineered, mechanical
process of imitation and replication of progress in the West (Dichter 2003, 59).
Economists viewed capital as the engine of economic growth. Most practitioners
believed that growth was based on rapid industrialization, thus becoming a
synonym of deveÏopment. The metaphor of a machine is highly symbolic in this
period because of its fastness and the underlying supposition that a country could
develop and catch up with the West relatively quickly (Dichter 2003). The idea
was that the benefits of rapid economic growffi would “trickie down” to the poor.
There was a widespread belief that through policies on trade, interests and
currency exchange rates, “developing” countries would be able to expand their
economies in order to reach industrialization. Important elements such as
inequality or poverty were not viewed as being essential factors.
In 1960, one of the leading institutions in the development fieid, the World Bank,
estabiished the International Development Association (IDA) which would
provide long-term interest-free bans, credits and grants to bow-income countries
in order to support economic growth. This new division of concessional lending
would soon be known as officiai development assistance. The IDA sigrnficantly
broadened the World Bank’s clientele of recipient govemments and its scope of
work and mandate (Kapur, Lewis and Webb 1997, 1119). The Bank would
become the intermediaiy for new govemment-to govemment concessional
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transfers that would later condition future multilateral concessional lending
(Kapur, Lewis and Webb 1997). Moreover, the Institution would flot only
function as an IFI, it would also assume the role of an international development
organization.
During this penod, the Bank viewed infrastructure as the sine qua non of
industrial development. Consequently, most of its development initiatives
involved fmancing projects to build roads, power plants, dams etc. While
development was a priority for the Bank, poverty reduction was flot. The
Institution considered that fmancing certain social fields such as education and
heaiffi might provoke a vast increase in demand for bans and therefore disturb the
soundness ofthe Bank’s management (Ayres 1983). Hence, the Institution did not
direct its lending toward low-income countnes or to specific sectors such as
health, education, and agriculture where the poor benefited dfrectly.
Throughout the 1960s the devebopment community believed that public sector
involvement in national economies was essential in order to accelerate
industrialization in developing countries. Economic growth remained the central
theme of development strategies. Practitioners stiil assumed that large public
infrastructure projects were a precondition for countries to achieve rapid
economic growth. This was exemplified in the World Bank’s lending between
fiscal years 196 1-1965, which allocated 76.8 of its financial assistance to electric
power and transportation projects (Ayres 1983). Development practitioners were
combining economic wiffi social infrastructure such as schools and universities,
raising knowledge transfer to a more formal and prominent level (Dichter 2003,
59). This type of knowledge transfer became known as technical assistance.
Within the United Nations, the 1960s was named the “Decade of Development”,
winch also coincided with the time when most of the world’ s new States became
independent. Many agree that the U.N.’s engagement in the development
endeavor was consolidated with the creation of the First Development Decade.
The main objective of the U.N.’s Devebopment Decade was more economic than
social. Goal-setting became prominent and time-bound targets included
accelerating economic growth in developing countries and more specifically
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creating conditions where national incomes of developing countries increased by
5% yearly by 1970 (www.un.org).
Most experts agree, that throughout the 1950s, 1960s and until the beginning of
the 1970s, economic growth was considered being synonymous with
development. Development theories viewed the amelioration of people’s
livelihoods as mere socio-economics retums to growth (Remenyi 2004, 25). The
main actors involved in development planning and implementation were technical
professionals from various sectors (engineering, law, demography agriculture etc.)
who were strongly committed to modemization. During this period, poverty
reduction was secondary to the goal of economic development. Development
translated into modemization, which was to be achieved through domestic
capacity building in technology, capital intensive industries as well as the
capacitation of the scientific base of production in traditional rural industries
(Remenyi 2004, 28). Modernization emphasized the diversion of national
production from consumption to investment, which would consequently reduce
low consumption levels.
Soon, much would change, or would it? In 1968, former US Secretary ofDefense,
Robert S. McNamara assumed the presidency of the World Bank. McNamara was
skeptical of the frickle-down theory, mainly because the benefits of growth were
not being distributed among the poorest in “developing” countries. He sustained
that security depended as much on poverty reduction as it did on economic
growth. McNamara began sbifting lending away from large economic
infrastructure proj ects toward agriculture, rural development and social services.
He took a strong interest in education, nutrition, health and population issues and
pushed them onto the poverty agenda. Other development issues were addressed,
such as urbanization, water, sanitation and basic needs. By the end of the 1 960s,
global poverty had emerged on the development agenda to become an
international priority. Poverty had become intrinsically related with economic
growth and new preoccupations such as gender equity and environruental
protection.
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McNamara’s poverty agenda and the emergence of the basic needs approach
(1970-1980)
McNamara’s World Bank
The McNamaran era of the World Bank was charactenzed by two major changes:
a large increase in the flow of financial resources from the Bank to “developing”
countries and a reorientation towards poverty reduction as the central objective of
its efforts. After 1973, the Bank sbifled the sectoral allocation of its resources
away from an exclusive focus on funding projects of basic economic
infrastructure towards funding proj ects explicitly committed to poverty reduction
in iow-income countries. Ail these changes iead us to beiieve that the Bank had
become the world’s largest anti-poverty agency at a time where the development
industiy had entered an era of poverty-oriented development projects.
As mentioned above, the first notable change was in lending, which increased,
from 6$ new projects approved by the Bank in 1968 to 266 in the 1981 fiscal
year8. In fiscal 1968 these initiatives totaled $953.5 million; in fiscal 1981, 12.4
billion. At the end of fiscal 1981 the total cumulative lending commitments ofthe
Bank and IDA were $92.2 billion. 0f this amount, ail but $13 billion were
allocated during the McNamara years. furthermore, the organization also grew,
from having a total of 767 professional staff in fiscal 196$ to 2,552 in fiscal 1981.
This reorientation was also reflected through the changes in the Bank’s lending
activities for development. for example, the World Bank’s lending for agriculture
and rural development represented only 18.1 percent of its total lending in 1968,
but increased to 31 percent of its total lending in 1981. Healih and education
components began to comprise a significant part of its projects. furthermore, the
Institution also became increasingly concerned with the problems of urban
poverty which led it to finance low-cost housing and slum rehabilitation projects.
One could say that the World Bank rapidly “moved to the vanguard of
international efforts on the antipoverty front”, mainly because it possessed the
resources to make the poverty agenda operational (Ayres 1983, 9).
Statistics and estimations of the Bank’ s lending and the growth of its staff during this period(1960’s-1980’s) were taken from Robert Ayres, «Banking on the Poor: the World Bank and
World Poverty ». Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983, p.4.
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McNamara focused strongly on the dimensions of world poverty, especially on
rural development. Most of the Bank’s research concentrated on the questions
surrounding poverty reduction. Consequently, the Bank produced a series of
sector policy papers that expressed its concems with sectoral poverty and
proposed the roles the Bank could play in attacking extreme poverty.
This new and bnef consensus on the centrality of poverty reduction was strongly
inspfred by the Cold War geopolitical imperative of preventing “poor countries”
from seeking solutions in Cornmunism. The focus on poverty reduction was also
motivated by the apparent failure of the trickle-down strategy to development.
Past efforts focusing on tnggering economic growth appeared to by-pass the poor
and those most in need. Moreover, in many cases development efforts were even
aggravating poverty, despite the fact that progress was being made in terms of
growth. In sum, it was evident that economic growth did flot necessarily translate
into the amelioration of the absolute poor’s living conditions. These facts forced
the industry to acknowledge that development assistance had to tackie poverty
directly.
Nevertheless, many within the Organization criticized McNamara’s failure to
acknowledge the need for structural adjustment in the 1970s. According to
Mosley, Hannigan and bye (1991), ifie Bank did flot show much concem for
adjustment during this period, instead it supported large-scale commercial
borrowing in order to maintain economic rates. Thus, growth during the 1 970s
had been pursued regardless of stability, but in the 1980s this would radically
change.
On the offier hand, many practitioners (ex. Ayres 1983) daim that the Bank’s new
concems for poverty reduction did flot alter the Institution’s fundamental
objectives which were ultimately economic growth. The Bank’s new poverty
oriented projects remained consistent with the Institution’s focus on growth and
development projects to facilitate this objective were considered the principal
instrument for achieving this goal. In the 1 970s social factors gained importance;
nevertheless, the industry preserved the prevailing system through reforms whose
necessity was flot previously understood (Ayres 2005, 11).
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Although McNamara’s Bank increased lending towards poverty onented
activities, one cannot assert that the Institution was entirely transformed into an
anti-poverty agency. Traditional lending grew at the same time and much poverty
oriented lending was considered highly fraditional (Ayres 1983). Furthermore,
anti-poverty projects undertaken by the Bank were consistent with its priority on
economic growth. Before McNamara obtained the presidency of the Bank, the
Institution believed that ifie key to growth was in investing in economic
infrastructure. Under his presidency the panacea was enlarged to include social
sector investments, human resource development and other anti-poverty related
activities. Moreover, the Bank did flot eliminate its traditional lending for projects
of basic economic infrastructure. Hence, while there was an increased focus of
poverty reduction during the McNamara presidency, the World Bank was far from
adopting a new paradigm.
The United Nations Poverty Agenda and the Emergence of the Basic Needs
Approach
During the 1 970s poverty reduction also occupied a prominent place within the
UN agenda. The concept of development was evolving to address social and
environmental issues. Within the UN speeialized agencies, development was
viewed as a human affair and not a mere economic enterprise.
The UN proclaimed its Second Development Decade in 1970 which reinforced
global poverty as the central theme of its agenda. The primary goal called for an
increase to 6% economic growth as an average to be achieved over a ten year
period (Emmerij, Jolly and Weiss 2000). This constituted the birth of the famous
target for aid that exhorted developed countries to attribute 0.7% oftheir national
income to foreign aid. The Second Development Decade also established goals
for the achievement of universal primary enrolment by 1990 and coordinated
efforts for eradicating various diseases.
Contemporaneous with the World Bank’s new emphasis on poverty reduction was
the emergence of the basic needs approach which asserted that the focus of aid
should shift from investment in capital formation to the development of human
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resources (Comwall and Brock 2005). Henceforth, bilateral and multilateral
assistance programs would emphasize the importance of satisfying material needs
or ensuring the minimum acceptable levels of food, nutrition, drinldng water,
basic health, shelter and education. During this period many practitioners believed
that poverty created disabling traps that held and kept populations poor. In order
to break these poverty traps govemment intervention and policies needed to
secure and guarantee the basic needs of populations.
The focus on basic needs was advocated by economists Mahbub ul Haq and Paul
Streeten in the late 1970’s. Dr. Haq’s 1976 seminal study, The Poverty Curtain is
considered by many as bemg the precursor to this approach. The basic needs
approach to development was founded on the acknowledgement that the benefits
of economic growth do not necessarily trickle-down to those most at need. It can
therefore be considered a direct response to the critique on the divergence and gap
between growth and equity at a time where it seemed that economic growth in
low-income countries often reinforced inequalities (Streeten 1981). This
approach was concerned with eradicating mass deprivation and assuring the
satisfaction of elementary needs to populations in “developing countries”. The
hypothesis of the basic needs theory was that a group of selective policies would
quickly facilitate the satisfaction of human basic needs of populations at income
levels (per head) substantially lower than those requfred by a Iess discriminating
economic growth strategy (Streeten 1981, 38).
According to Paul $freeten, the basic needs approacli fias several advantages over
previous approaches:
“..the basic needs concept is a rerninder that the objective of the development
effort is to provide ail human beings with the opportunity for a full life.
b consider basic needs is to move from the abstract to the concrete, from
aggregate to specific.
.the basic needs approach appeals to members of the national and international
and is therefore capable ofrnobilizing resources (Streeten and al. 1981, 21-22)
91n 1974, the Development Research Center ofthe World Bank and the Sussex Institute ofDevelopment Studies pubiished Redistribution and Growth which questioned the impacts of
economic growth on distribution.
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The basic needs approach primary objective was to provide the populations with
the opportunity of achieving full mental, physical and social development. Non
monetaiy needs were pnoritized because ffiey were viewed as being important
conditions for satisfying material needs.
However, in practice, tins approach continued to emphasize growth over
redistribution and established scientifically based standards and measurable
objectives for health care, nutrition, education as well as many other basic social
services (Clark 2005, 73). Although the industiy gave new emphasis to the
importance of satisfying basic needs, projects of a top-down nature remained the
principal vehicle for aid agency influence (Robb 2004, 23). Furthermore, these
initiatives continued to be viewed as economic and technical interventions rather
than social processes. To tins regard, Gilbert Rist (1997) offered a valuable
critique to the basic needs approach, arguing that concept fails to challenge the
basic assumptions of the classical economic theory.
Others sustain that the basic needs approach disappeared into a rhetonc of welfare
(Remenyi 2004). According to these critics, the focus on the welfare needs of the
poor diverted attention from the importance of increasing populations’ and their
environment’s productivity. furthermore, they sustained that policies directed at
the poor were highly patemalistic and highly dependent on extemal technical
assistance. Joe Remenyi (2004) daims that at the beginning of the 1 970s the
meaning of development remained marked by a technocratic, elitist and
patemalistic tone. There was littie appreciation of the knowledge and savoir-faire
that local populations could contribute to development.
The focus on poverty and meeting basic human needs would soon end and
instead, concems of an economic nature would take center stage. The 1970’ s
series of oil crises, which leU “developing” countries to increase borrowing and
debt, would have a strong impact on the development agenda. These crises had a
disastrous effect on developing countries that were heavily dependent on ou
exports for fostering industrialization. Most lacked the financial resources needed
to pay for ou due to drops in commodity prices of products they exported. The
fact that few “deveÏoped” countries achieved the goal of providing 0.7 percent of
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their GDP in the form of ODA exacerbated the crisis. With declining aid flows,
low-income countries were forced to increase borrowing and on progressively
harder terms. Debt service repayments increased from 9.6 percent per year during
the 1 960s to 16.5 percent at the beginning of the 1970s (Clark 2005).
Furthermore, climbing interest rates affected countnes’ capacity to repay their
debts and consequently led to massive payment imbalances. By the end of the
1 970s the problem of debt had pushed poverty reduction off the development
agenda and paved the way for the imminent structural adjustment programs.
Structural adjustment programs: a shift away poverty reducfion (1980-1990)
In the context of development thinking, the 1 980s was influenced by World Bank
and IMF strategies of macroeconomic structural adjustment. Tbroughout the
decade, the World Bank displayed a strong conviction that the objective of
development policy for the “developing world” was ifie achievement of rapid
economic growffi. It was a shift back to the premise ifiat economic growth
preceded poverty reduction. This belief was shared flot only by the IMf, but also
by Washington-based policy makers, creating a general agreement that would be
referred to by John Williamson as “the Washington Consensus” (Pender 2001).
The SAPs were based on neo-liberal economic thinldng which promoted the
elimination of State interference in financial and capital markets as well as ah
barriers to international trade (Stighitz 2002, 59). Although the stated objective of
the BWIs was economic growth, their interventions became extremely politicized
while their rhetoric continued being highly technical and functional10.
Structural adjustment programs stem from classical mainstream liberal economic
theory. However, it constitutes a break with ifie Keynesian economic principle
that considers the State as a key agent in economic growth. The World Bank
would emphasize the importance of fiscal discipline, restrictions on state spending
and the reduction of balance of payments deficits (Pender 2001). It would enforce
structural adjustment programs though the application of conditionahities; a topic
that we wihl discuss later on.
10 for more information, consuit Griffin, K., « foreign aid after the CoId War », 22 Development
and Change 4 (1991).
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Two major events in 1981 influenced the Bank’s new direction in ternis of its
development agenda and discourse: the anival of the Reagan administTation in the
US and a new president at the Bank, A.W. Clausen. In the early 1980s,
conservative govemments came to power among some of the World Bank’s
largest shareholder countries (US, Germany, UK). These conservative
governments viewed past poverty-oriented projects as being welfare programs
with marginal retums that should flot be undertaken by an institution such as the
Bank.
Secondly, Clausen’s appointment implied a new agenda for the Bank, winch
would be highly different from that of McNamara. His presidency was
characterized by an abrupt shift away from poverty reduction which had
constituted the main theme in World Bank operations throughout the 1970s.
Between 1982 and 1987, the Bank focused on growth-oriented projects, leaving
poverty reduction far behind. There were new concems such as energy and
structural adjustment winch made outsiders question the Bank’s commitment to
poverty reduction.
Structural Adjustment bans
The debt crisis, winch worsened in the 1980s, was having a devastating effect on
development by undermining the potential for new investments and by
handicapping national economies. In order to redress these economies, the World
Bank’s operations cinef, Emest Stem developed a structural adjustment ban
which first appeared in 1980 and linked new Bank bans to macroeconomic
reforms for borrowers.
Rolph van der Hoeven defines structural adjustment policies as:
“a set of pohcies which combine short-mn stabilization measures and longer-mn
adjustment measures, which are either applied sequentially or simultaneously or
overlap each other” (Vander Hoeven 2003, 61).
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Box 2: Six elements characterizing SAPs (Van der Hoeven 2003, 61-62)
Six elements characterizing SAPs
• Fiscal policies designed to reduce the budget deficit
• Monetaiy policies designed to reduce the money supply
• Wage and pnce policy designed top control inflation
• Exchange rate policies to reduce balance of payment deficits
• Reform of trade policies in order to achieve “free trade”
• Restructuring of the public sector and privatization of publicly owned
enterprises to reduce fiscal deficit
Three important elements characterized the 1980s structural adjustment bans.
The first factor was the use of non-project or program lending, which was given
as general support for a deficit balance of payments in order to facilitate imports
and stimulate economic growth and development (Mosley, Harrigan and Toye
1991). Another important element was the combination ofprogram lending with
policy reform conditions. Finally, the last underlying factor was the broadening of
these conditions from sectorallsub-sectoral to the national macro-economic level.
This methodobogy reflected ffie overwhelming presence of economists within the
Bank, in contrast with the early dominance of professional engineers throughout
the first decades. Economists were highby skeptical of project aid, due to the
problem of ffingibility and the risk that they may create a misleading sense of
certainty about the output of aid on development.
Structural adjustment bans were perceived as being an instrument in the hands of
the Bank’s powerful shareholders, capable ofpressuring deveboping countries into
following orthodox liberal economic prescriptions of price reform and
privatization. The Bank stated that $APs were needed to meet an existing or to
avoid an impending balance of payments crisis (World Bank Annual Report 198$:
22). By the mid-eighties the Bank defended the SAPs as the means of persuading
governments to change their economic policies in order to reform the internai
factors that were perceived as being the main cause of poor deveiopment
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performance. Furthermore, the degrading international economic environment in
the 1980s was also used to justify the use of adjustment lending.
As stated earlier, under structural adjustment programs, countries were lent money
on the condition they adopt a series of reforms imposed by the Bank that included:
a cutback on public spending, curbing inflation, liberalizing imports and
maintaining flexible exchange rates (Clark 2005, 80). John Pender daims:
“World Bank and IMF intervention through conditionality associated with
Structural Adjustment was thus formally promoting economic growth, but by
imposing a very particular model of development and a narrow set of economic
instrnments.”(Pender 2001, 399)
Tins model would hinder “developing” countries’ capacity of creating and testing
endogenous development models. It is important to underline that conditionality
during this period was nevertheless resfricted to the economic reaim.
The objectives of stabilization and structural adjustment depended heavily on
market forces and a diminished role of the State. In most cases, structural
adjustment led to greater poverty within “developing” countries, where these
policies contributed to an increase in unemployment rates and reduced spending
on basic needs (health, education etc). By fostering the globalization of frade as a
primary priority, SAP exacerbated inequalities within “developing” countries and
between “developing” and industrialized countries. In sum, the panacea for
reducing poverty during tins decade was considered to be economic growth
through market friendly mechanisms.
Within the U.N. forum, the eighties gave birffi to the Third Development Decade.
During tins decade the main economic goal was to raise GDP growffi rate to 7%.
The General Assembly Resolution for the 3rd Development Decade stated that its
strategy would strive to achieve the “accelerated development of developing
countries”(www. un.org). The resolution highlighted that in order to achieve the
objectives of the 3td Development Decade, changes in the configuration of the
world economy and in the economies of “developed” and “developing” counfries
themselves, had to be made. Thus, tins U.N. Development Decade had a strong
focus on trade and industrialization.
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Many refer to the 1980s as bemg the “lost” decade. “Developing” countries faced
debt service payments which exceeded what they could borrow, while ODA
declined. Structural Adjustment Programs forced countries to cut social spending,
deterioratmg the daily conditions of the poor. But as the effects of SAP began to
be felt on the poor, the development industiy witnessed an unintended effect of its
intervention: more intense poverty. In 1987, UNICEF reacted by publishing
Adjustment With a Human face which higfflighted the social impacts of SAPs.
Furthermore, the negative social effects of SAPs brought a renewed emphasis on
poverty reduction and meeting basic needs at the end of the decade. In retrospect,
one could ascertain that the 1980s cannot be considered a penod of innovative or
bold advances in international anti-poverty initiatives.
The introduction of good govemance debate
At the end of the 1980s a large variety of issues associated with the concept of
“govemance” and originating within the neo-liberal economic paradigm came to
occupy an important place in the development debate. The notion of “good
govemance” emerged in 1989 in the World Bank report on Sub-Saharan Africa
winch identified the crisis in tins geographical region as a “crisis of governance(Santiso 2001). The introduction of tins term in development discourse reflects
flue growing concems over the effectiveness of aid, whose inputs in poverty
reduction efforts were producing very frustrating resuits. The inefficiency of aid
was being attributed to recipient govemments’ Jack of commitment to reform and
the increasing incidences of corruption in “developing” countries. By adopting
tins concept, the World Bank and numerous donors questioned the ability,
capacity and will of recipient countries to govem effectively and in the interest of
their population (Santiso 2001).
According to the World Bank’s definition of the concept, govemance includes the
form of political regime, the process by winch authority is exercised in managing
the country’s financial and human resources for development and the
government’s capacity to formulate and implement policies (World Bank 1991).
World Bank researchers have identified six main dimensions to good governance:
voice and accountability, government effectiveness, lack of regulatory burden, the
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mie of law as well as the independence of the judiciary and the control over
corruption (Kauffman, Kraay and Zoido Lobaton 1999).
Carlos Santiso (2001) underlines that the approach employed to enforce good
govemance in “developing countries” is very similar to the one used to promote
economic reform; aid conditionality is merely extended to the political arena. By
employing this approach, the IfI’s strive to achieve successful governmental and
social reengineering in recipient countnes (Santiso 2001, 3). The World Bank was
entering a highly political territory by engaging in an enterprise that was
traditionally considered as being outside of its mandate and a violation to its
founding charter which clearly prohibits the organization from considering
political considerations when developing aid programs. The Bank was therefore
obligated to express a false sense of political neutrality by concentiating on the
effectiveness of the State rather than the equity of the economic system or the
legitimacy of the power structure (Santiso 2001, 4). Good govemance has proven
to be a difficuit concept for development agencies and donors who want to be
perceived as being apolitical and engaged in strictly technical endeavors.
1990s: Another shift towards poverty reduction
In the 1990s, development thinking became highly influenced by the human
development approach. Mahbub ul Haq was one of the founders of the human
development ffieory. This approach was an affempt to shift the focus of
development from national income accounting to people-centered polices (Haq
1995). Nevertheless it was Amartya Sen’s work on capabilities which provided
the conceptual and theoretical foundation for this approach. Sen (1985) defines
capabilities as “the overali freedoms of people to lead the kind of lives they have
reason to value”. According to Sakiko Fukuda Parr, Sen’s ideas would constitute
the core principles of the human development approach. Parr sustains: “This
approach is a paradigm based on the concept of well-being that can help define
public policy. . .“ (Fukuda Parr 2003, 1) It would influence the World Bank
reorientation towards poverty reduction. Whule leading development organizations
appropriated a human development terminology, we could stili witness the
predominance of the neo-liberal paradigm.
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However, the human development approach did force donors to evaluate the
effects of their macroeconomic policies on poverty. Many international
development institutions had no choice but to tum to poverty reduction oriented
strategies. After being subject to harsh criticism from civil society groups and
offier actors directly affected by the 1980s SAPs, the World Bank published a
World Development Report in 1990 centered on poverty reduction. The 1990
WDR widened the concept of poverty to include the deprivation of fundamental
rights such as education, health and nutrition. This report became the foundation
for a series of policy changes which have altered discourse within the
development industry.
The 1990 World Development Report was based on a three-pillar approach: labor
intensity, investment in physical and human capital of the poor and the
reinforcement of social safety nets (Booth and Mosley 2003, 4). The objective of
this approach was to strengthen the command of the poor over their resources in
order to increase their productivity. Nevertheless, the 1990 WDR had a strong
macro-economic focus. The main ingredients of the Bank’s approach to poverty
reduction continued to be open markets and stable macro-economic policy to
nurture labor intensive growth. However, one could observe that a graduai
broadening of the Bank’s definition poverty was progressively emerging.
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that ifie concept “inequality” was aimost
absent from the 1990 WDR.
On the other hand, the Bank commenced a data-gathenng effort called the Social
Dimension of Adjustment Survey in low-income countries, which made annual
data on poverty in “developing” countries public for the first time (Booth and
Mosley 2003). Moreover, the Bank’s Poverty Reduction Handbook placed
poverty alleviation at the top of the Institution’s priorities. These actions were
emulated by the development industry as a whole.
Moreover, the UN approach to poverty reduction tended to be very
multidisciplinary. Even though the Bretton Woods Institutions have dominated the
development agenda because of thefr large scale lending, the UN has brought
forth some of the key concepts of today’s war on poverty. These include human
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development, gender equity, and sustainable development. furthermore, in
contrast to past decades, the World Bank seemed to be cooperating more closely
with UN agencies.
From the late 1 9$Os the UNDP also began pushing for a more “human-oriented
development strategy” based on poverty reduction, social justice, participation,
and employment creation (Emrnerij and al. 2001, 137). Most importantly, a series
of Human Development Reports began to be published in 1990 and made a
cntical evaluation of the development orthodoxy pertaining to that time. The
HDR put people at the center of analysis and made policy recommendations that
were built on the notion of human development, defining the notion as the process
of broadening people’ s choices and strengthening capacities. furthermore, the
Human Development Report also introduced new indicators for measuning
development and poverty reduction: the human development index (HDI). The
HDI is a composite measure based on three indicators including longevity,
educational attainment and access to resources for a decent standard of living
(Emmerij and al. 2001, 139). The HDI represented an alternative measure of
development as opposed to the traditional GDP.
furthermore, in 1991, the UN launched its 4th Development Decade in an attempt
to change the industry’s record of unsatisfactory progress and performance. The
principal aim of tins decade continued to be accelerated development.
Nevertheless, the United Nation’s strategy paid special attention to the policies
and measures needed in the areas of poverty alleviation, human resource
development and the environment. The Resolution undenlined that reactivating
development required a supportive environment for international trade. In sum,
the Resolution stressed the fact that in order to achieve poverty eradication, the
development process needed to be responsive to social needs, promote the
development and utilization of human resources and assure a sound sustainable
environment (www.un.org).
The birth of the New Poverty Agenda
In October 199$, the World Bank’s president, Wolfensohn asserted the pnionity of
poverty alleviatïon in the Bank’s new holistic “architecture” of development:
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“Development is about getting the macroeconomics right. . .but.. . also aboutbuilding roads, empowering people. .protecting the environment...”Cwww.worldbank.org)
On the other hand, it is also important to note Wolfensohn’ s and Stiglitz’ s efforts
to push the Institution and other development agencies toward policy changes in
directions long supported by the UNDP and other institutions in the U.N. system.
The Bank’s new development framework considered poverty alleviation as being
much more than a question of income; it was viewed as a comprehensive strategy
that included access to basic services, empowennent and participation as well as
adequate infrastructure.
In 2000, the Bank published another World Development Report centered on
poverty. This WDR differed from that of 1990 in its recommendations, its process
and even its definition of poverty. The Bank now defined poverty as the
“pronounced deprivation of well-being” rather than solely a deprivation of income
(Booth and Mosley 2003, 5). WDR 2000/01 also broadened the notion ofpoverty
to include vulnerability and the exposure to risk. Tins Report is innovative, being
that its focus is not limited to the macroeconomic approach winch addresses the
relationship between growth and income poverty, but includes non-income factors
in its definition ofpoverty.
The 2000/0 1 WDR is also based on three pillars: empowerment, security and
opportunity. A large number of policies associated with the security themes make
reference to the 1990 WDR’s emphasis on social safety nets, while “opportunity”
elaborates the possibilities for developing the human and physical capital of the
poor contained in the earlier report. However, the empowennent theme is flot
mentioned in the 1990 WDR. The concept of “social capital” is new in the WDR
2000/0 1 report. Tins term is defmed as the “ability of individuals and households
to secure benefits by membership of social networks”, enabling the poor to
empower themselves (Booth and Mosley 2005, 8).
The empowerment theme recognizes that political, institutional and social causes
of poverty are inherently Iinked to its economic causes. Empowerment will bnng
about social cohesion winch in tum constitutes an essential determinant of
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economic growth. The 2000/01 WDR considers social capital to be as important
and influential in poverty reduction as human and physical capital.
The “vulnerability” theme emphasizes the importance of policies promoting
security. Past experiences have proved that that vulnerability to shocks is one of
the main reasons populations fali into poverty. The WDR addresses the
importance of protection and prevention from certain shocks such as financial
crises, market instability, illness, and natural disasters (ding and al 2003, 31).
The concept of security is contradictory to the World Bank’s pure market
economy approach and is therefore subject to conflict. Nevertheless, the objective
of security policies is to protect the market’s losers and promote safety net
mechanisms that benefit the poor.
finally, the “opportunities” theme cails for free-market reforms and deregulation
at the microeconomic Ïevel. According to the World Bank, markets should be
“pro-poor” or enable the poor to acqufre assets and obtain the best opportunities.
Moreover, development polices should address microfmance, land reform, tax
policies and human capital.
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Table 2: Pillars and Policies of WDR 1990 and WDR 2000/01
WDR 1990
Pillars Associated Pillars Associated Policies
Policîes
Labor • SmalI
intensity scale
indusfry
• Special
employ
ment
measures
• Green
revolution
in small
farm
agriculture
• Investment • Promotion • Opportunity • Micro-financein human of primary
capital for health and
• Assetthe poor education
redistribution
policies
• Micro-
finance
• Measures to
reduce
inequality
• Pro-poor public
expenditure
pattems
• Social • Food • Security • “Tailor-made”safety nets subsidies social protection
measures
• Social
funds
• Measures to
support asset
diversification
insurance
• International
public goods
defenses against
economic crisis
• Empowerment • Democratization
• Decentralization
• Promoting
social capital
*Source: Booth and vosley, 2003
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furthermore, in the 2000/01 WDR, James Wolfensohn reiterates the Bank’s firm
belief in macro-economic stability and market-friendly reforms for reducing
poverty. He also recognizes the importance of focusing more on “institutional and
social foundations for the development process and on managing vulnerability and
encouraging participation to ensure inclusive growth” (WDR 2000/01, vi). This
confrasts with its 1990 Report which focuses on labor-intensive growth and
expanded social services.
Some critics underline that this Report is less operational than previous WDRs.
Although tins Report has presented the international community with a new
multidimensional defmition of poverty it has flot been able to offer a clear
alternative to old poverty strategies. It fails to propose an alternative to the
Washington Consensus and provide precise political recommendations for
sustained poverty reduction (ding, 2003). The impact of international economic
relations, specifically in the domain of trade, and their impact on the poor are
superficially explored. Most of the analysis focuses on development aid.
furthermore, the Report does flot address the tradeoffs and conflict of interests
that will inevitably arise between the elite and the marginalized from this new
stance based on empowerment, and opportunity. Moreover, with this new
approach, the apolitical World Bank was inevitably entering higffly political
ten-itory; however it has failed to address the potential for conflict.
it is in tins me of thinldng that the Bank and the IMf developed a comprehensive
strategy for poverty reduction and discussed with national auffionties the design
of policies aimed at achieving tins objective. Together, the Bank and the IMf
created the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) with the purpose of
promoting and facilitating consultation with civil society, specifically the poor.
The objective of the PRSP was also to create a direct link between donors and to
stress the importance of working through partnerships with national govemments
rather than resorting to parallel structures for service provisions (Hinton and al.
2004, 4)11
. Participatory methods in project design and implementation
becoming very popular among development agencies. Anoffier example of
participation at the policy level was the emergence of the World Bank’s
The PRSPs wilI be studied extensively in Chapter 4
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participatory poverty assessments (PPA), which aimed to implicate the poor as
key actors in situational analysis (Robb 2004, 31). The PPAs also questioned the
classic, narrow defmition of poverty based on income and consumption measures.
To summarize, the World Bank and the U.N. have been contmuously rethinking
their overali development approach in light of past failures, the limited progress
accomplished in poverty reduction and the social tensions that have been
associated with it. Emmerij, Jolly and Weiss (2001) emphasize that there is
increasing evidence that at the beginning of this new millennium, a new
development discourse was emerging, with a vision more closely shared by the
UN system and the World Bank and IMF.
The New Poverty Agenda and the MDGs
By the year 2000 the development industry had reinstated poverty reduction as the
central objective of their agenda. With the birth of the “New Poverty Agenda” the
World Bank and IMF had adopted PRSPs as their primary policy instrument. As
for the United Nations, its General Assembly adopted the Millenrnum
Development Deciaration in September 2000 and selected the Millenrnum
Development Goals as their new development ftamework. Along with other
bilateral and multilaterai development institutions, the World Bank, and the IMF
have subscribed to the Goals. They are ail taking steps to harmonize their efforts
in order to achieve greater effectiveness. Moreover, most development activities
have converged around the MDGs.
We afready know that global goals similar to the MDGs have been set in the past,
afready becoming a centrai part of the development discourse in the 1 970s, and
suggesting that a greater priority to basic needs was requfred. Simon Maxwell
affirms that the MDGs emerged in the context of a “new poverty agenda”,
charactenzed by the introduction of a new multidimensional model of poverty,
headed by the UN and later by the World Bank (Maxwell 2004, 25). Tins thesis
will focus on two instruments that characterize the development industry’ s new
thinking on poverty (Maxwell 2004, 25):
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• Ihe Millennium Development Goals: a set of international, time-bound
development targets adopted by the United Nations at the 2000
Millennium Summit which embody the development industry’s new multi
dimensional approach to poverty reduction.
• PRSPs: the operational frameworks that translate MDG targets into
action, they are counfry-led and allegedly based on participatory
processes, accepted by donors on the basis of conditionality on process.
PRSPs should provide a road map for poverty reduction and increase aid
effectiveness.
Both articulate the explicit adoption of a multi-dimensional model of poverty with
emphasis on growth while stressing empowerment, opportunity and security.
Furthermore, both are strongly focused on the importance of ackieving a bigher
degree of aid efficiency.
Figure 2.1: The New Poverty Agenda and its operational instruments
MDGs
POVERTY
AGENDA
51
Conclusion
Today, the majority of development agencies have expressed a formai
commilment to poverty reduction as their primary priority. From 1990 onwards
one can observe an increased interest on poverty reduction goals, such as the
International Development Targets and the MDGs, by international development
agencies. furthermore, the development industry has adopted a muiti
dimensional defmition of poverty which includes a wider set of issues conceming
social exclusion and deprivation rather than the classic defmition centered on
narrow income-consumption.
On the other hand, PRSPs have also become an important part of the New Poverty
Agenda because they constitute a low-income country’s blueprint for their
development plans and for reaching the MDGs. furthermore, the PRSPs underline
priorities, policies and act as a basis for donor support.
The World Bank alleges that today, poverty reduction is its central objective. Over
the last 5 decades, poverty has been translated into various meanings, from a lack
of income to a lack of freedom. Approaches to poverty reduction and
development have also varied over the past. Durrng the 1950s the industiy fought
poverty through economic growth and industrialization. The industry viewed large
investments in physical capital and infrastructure as the means for achieving rapid
development Nevertheless, the 1 970s demonstrated that growth did not
necessarily equate to poverty alleviation. Poverty increased and inequalities were
intensified. Consequently, the development industry acknowledged that economic
infrastructure was flot enough and focused on satisfying basic needs through
direct interventions in social sectors such as heaiffi, nutrition and education. The
industiy’s focus on poverty alleviation and basic needs did not last long, in the
1 980s, following debt and ou crisis, the development community was witness to
another shift. After briefty reorienting its efforts towards anti-poverty oriented
strategies, the industry tumed to SAPs which threw many “developing” countries
even deeper into misery. During this decade, the industry focused on improving
economic management and promoting market-friendiy policies. The Bank
asserted that poor populations were likely to suffer in the short-term from SAPs,
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but adjustment was necessary for long-term growth. The effects of SAPs
underlined the need to address, once again, the basic needs of the poor (1990
WDR).
Today, another shift in development rhetoric lias occuned and poverty constitutes
once again the main theme of the development agenda. Several alternative
concepts have been appropriated by the leading actors of the development
indusùy and now dominate discourse: ownership, participation, partnership,
empowerment, etc. With the MDGs the development industiy has found the way
to measure progress in its war against poverty. The industry lias moved towards
the coordination of its development activities. However, does this new shift (in
discourse) translate into change in development practice? Up to now, we have
observed how the development industiy lias modified its rhetoric and adopted
normative concepts. Nevertheless, it has failed to change the prevailing theoretical
paradigm which continues to be strongly inftuenced by the neo-Ïiberal economic
model. from this point on, we will evaluate whether the leading institutions
wiffiin the development industry have changed their practices. In the next chapter
we will take a brief look at the origins of the MDGs and analyze the implications
surrounding these Goals.
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Chapter 3: Ihe Millennium Development Goals: a New Agenda
for Combating Poverty or Continuation of Traditional
Development Practice?
Introduction
There is a consensus within the development comrnunity that the Millennium
Declaration offers an appropriate human rights framework for ffie MDGs. The
MDGs have quickly achieved the status of panacea in international development
policy-making. For its supporters, ffie Goals constitute ffie comprehensive
articulation, at the highest political level, of key priorities of social, economic, and
environmental development that need to be addressed in order to achieve progress
in poverty reduction and sustainable development. The MDGs are particularly
important because they acknowledge that establishing a global partnership based
on collective responsibilities is key to achieving a sustainable advance in poverty
reduction. Nevertheless, the MDGs’ muÏtidùnensional nature has been
questioned, as well as its alleged focus on poverty reduction. Its detractors daim
that the MDGs target-oriented approach is currently overshadowing a more rights
based approach, ifius undermining the ability of many marginalized groups to
defend their social, cultural and economic rights. furthermore, many fear that the
popular MDG agenda will sideline other important issues such as human rights,
govemance and democratic inclusion. According to many cntics, the MDG do not
constitute an appropriate instrument for bringing about systemic gains in poverty
reduction. Moreover, if they continue to be pursued in the same manner, they risk
completely sidelining attention on critical issues such as inequality. Others believe
that the only change that the MDGs have produced is modifying development
discourse, rather than the substance of policies. This Chapter will evaluate these
arguments and attempt to shed greater light on whether the MDGs have brought
about change in the manner the development industry tackies poverty.
There is no doubt that the Millennium Development Goals have had profound and
contagious effect on the international development community. Development
agencies, donors, governments and many civil-society groups are uniting their
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efforts towards reaching the Goals. Nevertheless, the MDGs did not corne out of
thin air. So what are the MDGs and what are ffieir objectives? Where do they
corne from? What lias inspired this new global consensus? Who are the leaders,
advocates and supporters behind ifiese goals? Before we can engage in a deep
analysis on the implications the MDGs and the New Poverty Agenda have on the
development industiy it is important to familiarize ourselves with the facts
concerning these Goals.
Underlying facts behind the MDGs
The Millennium Deveiopment Goals (IvDGs) were adopted at the historic United
Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000. The MDGs reached the
international development scene at a time when officiai deveiopment assistance
had reached its lowest point since t 973 in real terms, hence creating an urgent
need for donor fmancing. Md fatigue among the donor community was largely
due to the perception that ODA was not being allocated efficiently and had flot
served the purpose of achieving significant gains in growtli and poverty reduction.
The Goals would represent an opportunity for campaigning for the increase and
doubling of aid. These campaigns would reinforce the ancient optimism that aid
was capable of eradicating poverty. One could affirm that parallel to their poverty
reduction objectives, the MDGs were given the task of rejuvenating and re
sourcing an aid regime that had suffered from a decade of loss and fatigue.
Table 3: Total Net Disbursement of Total Officiai and Private Flows by Type, 1971-2001 (%)Source: OECD (2004)
Ail Developing 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2002Countries
ODA Bilaterat 29.0 38.3 30.9
ODA Multilateral 7.7 12.5 12.7
Other Officiai FIows [ 8.7 6.6 4.3
Private Fiows 50.7 38.2 47.7
GrantsfromNGOs 3.9 4.4 4.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Secretaiy-General Koffi Annan presented the international comrnunity with “We
die Peoples: die Rote of the United Nations in the 2jSt Centuiy” which
underlined the great challenges facing global society: poverty, disease,
environmental hazards, and conflict (www.un.org ). This document was the
inspiration for the MilÏennium Declaration which was adopted by the Heads of
States present at the Summit.
The Millennium Declaration addresses these issues and underlines certain
fundamental values essential to international relations in the 21st century:
freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared
responsibility (vww.un.org ). Furthermore, it enumerates a series of quantified
and time-bound goals to reduce extreme poverty, disease and deprivation. These
goals were taken from the Declaration and integrated to what is now known as the
Millennium Development Goals.
The international community has set many development goals since the First
Development Decade of the 1960s. Nevertheless, the idea of sefting a unique
group of international deveÏopment targets came from a series of past UN world
conferences, particularly those that were held in the 1 990s (ex. World Summit for
Chiidren in 1990 and World Summit for Social Development in 1995).
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Table 3.1: The MDGs origins.
Source: (Black and White 2004)
Target Origin
Economic well-being
.
• Copenhagen Declaration and Program oJ
. Proportion ofpeople living in extreme
.
Action (1995)poverty in developing countnes should be
halved by 2015
Social Development: substantiai progress in
primary education, gender equality, basic healtb
care and family planning
• Jomtien Conference on Education for Ail
. Universal pnmary education should be
.
(1990)reached in ail countries by 2015
• Cairo Conference on Population and. Eliminating gender disparity in primary and
Development (1994), Copenhagen andsecondary education by 2015
Beijing Conference for Women
. 1990 Mortality rates for infants and
children under 5 should be reduced by 213 • Cairo, confirmed at Beijing
in ail developing countries by 2015
• maternaI mortality rates must be reduced b
.
• Cairo, contïrmed at Beijing% dunng this same penod
• access should be made available through
• Cairo
the primary healthy care system to
reproductive health services for ail
individuals of appropriate ages by 2015
Environmentai sustainability and
regeneration
• There should be a national strategy for
.
• Rio Conference on Environment and
sustainable development in the process
.
Development (1992)of implementation in every country by
2005 in order to reverse cuffent trends
in the loss of environmental resources
These targets were later compiled in 1996 by the OECD Development Assistance
Committee in an important meeting and became the International Development
Targets, a series of goals to be reached by 2015. Since the International
Development Goals originated in the donor community, ffiey neyer received a
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high level of acceptance from civil society groups in “developing” countries
(HDR 2003). Many CSOs strongly criticized the International Development
Targets for holding “developing” countries accountable for their progress without
acimowiedging the responsibilities of high-income countries and multilateral
institutions in their pÏight for poverty reduction.
Box 3: International Development Targets (Hunt 2004)
• Halve the proportion ofpeople living in extreme poverty by 2015
• Universal primary education with the elimination of gender disparities by 2005
• Reduction by 2/3 of 1990 child mortality rates in chuidren under 5 by 2015
• Reduction by h of 1990 maternaI mortality rates by 2015
• Universal access to reproductive health care services by 2015
• Reversal of the trends in Ioss of environmental resources through national strategies by 2015
The International Targets were later presented in the Millennium Declaration,
with an additional 8th goal addressing the responsibility of bigh-income countries.
Following extensive consultation among international development agencies such
as the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and other UN specialized agencies, the
General Assembly adopted ifie MDGs as the roadmap or blueprint for
implementing the Millennium Declaration.
The MDGs are seven quantifiable development goals, with th unquantifiable
goal pertaining to the responsibility of high-income countries. They can be
separated into three fields of action: economic development, social development
and environmental sustainability. The first seven goals cali for a large diminution
ofpoverty, disease and environmental degradation, while the 8th goal is essentially
a commitment of global partnership or a compact between low and high income
countries to work together to achieve ifie first seven goals.
5$
Table 3.2: the MDGs (www.un.org)
Millennium Development Goals (1990-2015)
Goal #1: Eradicate extreme poverty and Target #2: Cut by halfthe proportion ofpeoplehunger who suffer from hunger
Target #1: Cut by halfthe proportion ofpeople withless than one dollar a day.
Goal #2: Achieve universal primary Target #3: Ensure that boys and girls completeeducation primary schooling
Goal #3: Promote gender equality and Target #4: Eliminate gender disparity in primaryempower women and secondary education by 2005 and at ail levelsby 2015
Goal #4: Reduce child mortality Target #5: Reduce by two thirds the mortality ratefor chiidren under 5
Goal #5: Improve maternai heaith Target #6: Reduce by three-quarters the matemal
mortality ratio
Goal #6: Combat IUVIAIDS, malaria and Target #7: Stop and begin to reverse the spread ofother diseases HIV/AIDS
Target #8: HaIt and begin to reverse the spread of
malaria and tuberculosis
Goal #7: Ensure environmental Target #9: Integrate the principles of sustainablesustainability development in country policies and reverse loss of
environmental resources
Target #10: Cut by haif the proportion ofpeople
without access to potable water
Target #1l: Significantly improve the lives ofatleast 100 million slum dwellers by 2020
Goal #8: Develop a global partnershïp for Target # 12: Continue developing an open tradingdevelopment and financial system. Includes a commitment togood governance and national/intemational poverty
reduction
Target # 13: Address the least developed countries’
special needs in the areas oftrade, debt relief anddevelopment assistance.
Target # 14: Address the special needs of
landlocked and small isÏand developing States.
Target #15: Take measures to make debt sustainablein the long term
Target #16: Develop decent and productive workfor youth in cooperation with developing countries
Target # 17: Provide access to affordable essentialdrugs in developing countries, in cooperation with
,harmaceutical companies.
Target #18: Provide access to the benefits ofnew
technologies in cooperation with the private sector,
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These three areas embody the newly accepted multi-dimensional conception of
poverty (WDR 1990). Moreover, they constitute an attempt to demonstrate that
poverty reduction is the central objective of current development practice,
focusing on a wide variety of issues and not merely on issues concerning the leveÏ
of income.
furthermore, the Goals aim at realizing quantitative reductions in these multiple
dimensions of poverty by 2015. Their numerical targets were established on the
assumption that the global progress observed during the 1970’s and 19$O’s would
continue in the present and through the year 2015. The Goals enumerate targets
against which performance of donors, international development agencies and
recipient countries can be measured.
An essential element of the MDGs is the fact that they cail for a global partnership
and address issues such as trade, debt and technology transfer (8th goal). This
commitment forms the basis for the Millennium Development Compact, an
agreement through wbich the international community can work together to help
low-income countries reach ifie MDGs. Ibis compact calls for ah actors to orient
their efforts towards ensuring the success of the Goals, in a system of shared
responsibihities. MDG8 can be considered somewhat innovative, nevertheless
one should point out that it’s the only goal that does not establish time-bound
targets to achieve progress in areas which are higffly influential in achieving
sustainable poverty reduction.
Donors consider that the Goals help defme both the objectives of development
cooperation activities and the prionties to be fohlowed within these areas.
According to the development community these goals are well defined and
measurable, which mobilizes a great deal of support from donors. There is also an
evident emphasis on quantitative analysis, including basic statistical data and the
monitoring and evaluation of policy refonn and development program
effectiveness (www.worldbank.org ). Moreover, the development community
affirms that these goals represent a consensus on the sustainable development
agenda and promote strong donor coordination.
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Finally, within the development industry, the MDGs are well-known for their
capacity of putting human development at ffie center of the agenda. Much of their
support is due to the fact that they allegedly constitute a shifi away from growth
as the primary goal of the development endeavor. Moreover, the Goals provide a
framework for accountability by defming concrete targets that can be monitored.
Fukuda Parr highlights that the MDGs are the first global compact’2 to address
inputs from rich countries, therefore holding both rich and poor govemments
equally accountable, in rhetoric (Fukuda Parr 2004).
Figure 3: Three key elements characterizing theMDGs
The MDGs have been widely accepted and encouraged by international
deveÏopment and donor agencies. Large multilateral development and financial
12 The issue of global compact and partnership wilI be discussed later in the chapter.
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institutions such as the UN, the World Bank and the IMF as well as bilateral
donors, development agencies and NGOs have rallied behind the Goals and
concerted their efforts towards their achievement. Unlike any other development
agenda, the Goals have ifie entire development community engaged in their
implementation through a variety of channels. First there is the UNDP which is in
charge of monitoring and therefore receives MDG country reports on
implementation. There is also the World Bank, which has rendered the Goals
operational through their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.
One of the most influential people working on the achievement of the MDGs is
economist Jeffrey Sachs. He is also the Special Advisor to the United Nations
Secretary-General Koffi Annan on the MDGs. Sachs was delegated the task of
creating an operational plan in which the UN, govemments and civil society can
contribute to the achievement of the MDGs. Finally, lie is the Director of the UN
Millennium Project which is devoted to developing a global plan for meeting the
Goals.
The UN Millennium Project is composed of ten task forces that cover the different
problems and issues that are embodied in the Goals. Each task force is composed
of practifioners, policy experts and other stakeholders who participate in
deliberative efforts. The project lias also engaged the entire UN system through an
expert group composed of representatives from its leading specialized agencies.
UN country teams are also involved in the Proj ect, working together with experts
and acting as a liaison between UN headquarters and the on-the-ground realities
ofthe Organization’s engagement in “developing” countries (Sachs 2005, 223).
In addition, the UN lias also created the Millennium Campaign which is mandated
to inform and encourage people’s involvement and engagement in the realization
offfie MDGs. The Campaign was launched by the UN in October 2002, two years
after the MDGs had been adopted. The Millennium Campaign encourages
existing civil society organizations, networks and movements to unite and work
together for the same cause: the achievement of the Goals. As one can observe,
there lias been a large degree of mobilization around the MiÏlenrnum
Development Goals.
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These are the basic facts concerning the origin, the purpose and the leading
figures behind the Millennium Development Goals. It is evident that the MDGs
manifest the international community’s cunent sentiment of urgency in dealing
with poverty. They also serve as the concrete articulation of the new multi
dimensional defimtion of poverty, one that focuses on much more than income
growth. The targets that embody the MDGs are flot new, they are the product of
multiple international development conferences held throughout the 1 990s that
have been compiled and have become important fields of action in today’s war on
poverty. However, the question this chapter aims to answer is whether or flot the
MDGs constitute a new way of tacklmg poverty reduction.
MDGs quantitative targets and results-based approach
When analyzmg current development discourse one can observe how resuits and
aid effectiveness have moved to the center of the debate. But how can we explain
this phenomenon? Experts daim that declining aid volumes in the 1 990s and
unsatisf’ing resuits in almost a generation of development assistance in
“developing” countries can be considered an important factor. Nevertheless, one
can also point out the increasing demand in OECD countries for public sector
efficiency and effectiveness and the shift towards resuits orientation in public
management (OECD 2002). Finally, the possibility of achieving substantially
increased amounts of aid from major donors also underlines the importance of
improving the effectiveness of development assistance. Accordmg to its
adherents, the results-based approach promotes accountability, evaluation,
reporting and stimulates knowledge and learning. furthermore, organizations that
are results-focused are viewed as being more effective in ensuring that resource
allocations to countries respond to resuits (OECD 2002).
The heated debate surrounding the effectiveness or counter-productivity of aid is
one of the most important issues facing the development community todayt3. Aid
inefficiency is often attributed to factors such as fungibility, insufficient alignment
between donors and recipient governments, Jack of policy coherence among donor
13For more information, consuit Robert Cassen, « Does Aid Work? » New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1994.
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activities and the commercial tying of aid (McGillivray 2004). Today, the leading
players of the development industry have engaged in the “retbinking of aid”.
They have acknowledged the need to re-conceptualize the role of deveiopment
assistance in light of the increasing threat that global poverty represents. In this
regard, the World Bank (199$) published Assessing Aid: What Works, What
doesn ‘t and Why? This policy research report culminates a Bank research
program on the effectiveness ofaid14.
The target-oriented approach present in the Millennium Development Goals
reflects the growing popularity of results-based interventions. However, goal
seffing has been strongly criticized over the years by scholars and even by
numerous development practitioners. From the beginning, sceptics have argued
that global goals would lead to top-down processes in planning and
implementation, with participation of local groups and therefore ownership at
stake. Others daim that the selection of development goals is higffly biased,
prioritizing those that are intemationaily favored by donors rather than ifiose that
“developing” countries fmd to be more pertinent. Hence, global goals are strongly
determined by “external experts” and overly concemed with measurable
outcomes. Moreover, numerous risks corne with a target-oriented approach; we
will evaluate some in this section.
First of ail, goal-setting leads donors to prioritize quantitative over qualitative
achievement. This strong preoccupation wiffi measurabie resuits implies a great
deal of support for top-down, targeted interventions to deliver on the chosen
outputs and the neglect of developrnent outputs that are not easily measured
(Satterwaite 2003, 9). Consequently, a target-oriented approach prioritizes
outputs rather than the quality of inputs or processes (Salord 2005). for this
reason, many daim that the Goals ignore many of the non-material aspects of
poverty which are ofien unquantifiable’5. In other words, the resuits-based
14 Written by David Collar and Lant Pritchett, it constitutes an aftempt to understand when aidworks, when it doesn’t and why. Its principal idea is that for aid to be effective it must beaccompanied by sound economic institutions and policies.
15 Refer to Vandemoortele (2004) and Minujin and Delamonica (2005).
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management underlymg this target-oriented approach can risk overshadowing the
importance of tackiing the structural causes ofpoverty.
Furthermore, this focus on quantitative resuits does flot allow for a distinction
between good practice and bad practice. This could lead to the adoption of
controversial and potentially damaging anti-poor policies (ex. the privatization of
basic services) without regard to the long-term effects on the equitable
redistribution of national assets.
Ideally, quantitative goal setting in poverty reduction is meant to improve the
well-being of underprivileged populations. However, one must underline that
global trends on which the Goals are based, are the result of aggregating millions
of very different trends across individuals, families, commumties and countries.
National development strategies and plans cannot be based on such aggregations
because they do not take into account a countiy’s history, social and gender
disparities or specific challenges. Global targets, such as the MDGs risk becoming
nothing more than one-size —fits-ali objectives without any conceptualization,
making them highly inadequate at the local level.
Moreover, proportionally, the populations most in need benefit less from progress.
Target-setting usually ends up improving the well-being of the befter-off segment
of the population. National development policies can be highly biased in directing
social and economic investments in favor of these segments of the population,
therefore making it easier to achieve global targets, but increasing inequality in
the process. Furthermore, it could also push local and national officiais to produce
false statistics in order to avoid admitting total failure and a lack of capacity in
monitoring and evaluation. for poverty reduction targets to be pro-poor, social
and economic indicators for the most disadvantaged people must improve more
rapidly than the rest of the population. finaÏly, many experts daim that goal
setting could create excessive optimism thereby causing frustration and
exasperating aid fatigue if global goals are not achieved (Satterwaite 2003).
Nevertheless positive aspects to goal setting do exist. The authors, Richard Black
and Howard White (2004), in Targeting Devetopment: Critical Perspectives on
die Mitiennium Devetopment Goals, daim that it constitutes a way of defming an
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organization’s role. This has become very important at a time where the
development industiy faces aid pessimism, past failures and even a loss of
credibility. Black and White sustain that goal-setting aims to resolve the issue of
responsibility by allegedly promoting upward as well as downward forms of
accountability. In principle, with clear targets for development, international aid
agencies can be held accountable for their performance. But are the international
aid agencies really the ones being judged? Finally, Black and White sustain that
goal-setting helps to increase the cohesiveness of the international development
community and has brought new political impetus to poverty reduction efforts.
Even with its numerous critics, international goal-seuing continues to be a highly
popular instrument within the development community.
Since the 1 960s, the international development industry has tackled pressing
issues of poverty and hunger by the means of packages and goal-setting.
However, international goal- setting lias flot produced any long-term sustainable
development. Even though various goals have been achieved at the global level,
they have failed to be comprehensively implemented. This lias justified strong
criticism from academics and practitioners who are higlily sceptic of international
goal-setting and the way the industiy lias managed development as a whole.
We ail know that global goal-setting can be effective in mobilizing actors towards
implementing development agendas. They have set trends over the years and leU
to the production of an important amount of literature. Nevertheless, one needs to
question to what extent global goals have a long-tenn and sustainable effect in
countries that are most affected by poverty, even when they are met.
Whule tlie MDG targets may have broadened the set of outcomes by which aid
will be judged, there has not been any real discussion on the methods or inputs
that need to change to ensure that the desired resuits are achieved in a sustainable
manner. furthennore, target —driven approaches often pay littie attention to the
processes or measures through which the targets are addressed. For many, the
Millennium Development Goals exasperate this trend. Performance targets offer
a standard against which the implementation of poverty reduction strategies can
be measured, but they can end up oversimplifying the highly complex and
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mterrelated dimensions of poverty. furthermore, by setting targets on the basis of
quantifiable indicators, the development industry is promoting a simplistic
definition ofpoverty.
The MDGs focus on poverty and human development
The MDGs are explicit targets for progress but do they detract from important
obligations? As mentioned previously, the Millennium Development Goals
originated in the Millennium Declaration. The Declaration itself was inspired on
international human rights treaties such as ffie International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. Consequently, many supporters affinn that the Goals are themselves based
on human rights. According to the U.N., the Goals are founded on a human
development framework, where poverty is viewed as being multidirnensional,
manifesting itself in the form of illiteracy, disease, malnutrition etc. Moreover, the
UN daims that the Millennium Development Goals promote a cross-sectoral
approach with the potential of producing numerous advances in the multiple
dimensions of poverty.
Nevertheless, even with ah the support, the MDGs have flot been able to escape
the reprehension of critics and sceptics. Many argue that unlike the Millennium
Declaration, the Goals do flot focus on the rights-approach or Jegal framework the
UN has been mandated to implement (Salord 2005). Goals, such as access to basic
services and the eradication of hunger, constitute fundamental human rights and
should 5e viewed as such, and not just as a mere statistical necessity or target.
According to critics, the MDGs support the commodification of basic social
services rather than worldng towards the achievement of their universal access.
Furthermore, the overwhelming importance given to the MDGs by the
development industry and the place it occupies in current development discourse
could push the international community to neglect other UN instruments that do
priontize human rights. They may consequently minimize numerous issues that
achieved importance in UN Conferences during the 1990s, leading to abandoned
commitments. Furthermore, this could entail the disempowennent of many
marginalized groups in their negotiations with national govemments on human
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nghts issues. The World Bank and the IMF have aiways hesitated to recognize, or
even less, adopt a rights-based framework for dealing with poverty reduction.
Although it has acknowledged the importance of poverty reduction being central
to their mandate, it has failed to ensure that the multi-dimensional nature of
poverty be dfrectly addressed in its own programming.
As stated previously, the MDGs are higffly concemed with measurable outputs
and therefore focus on the dimensions of poverty that are easily quantifiable.
Consequently, the Goals rely on indicators that are concepmally flawed and
depend on constructions that unreliable, like the controversial “US $1 a day
poverty une”, or indicator for absolute poverty (Vandemoortele, 2004). To date,
absolute poverty has been the main indicator for assessing progress towards the
Millennium Development Goals. This indicator measures the proportion of a
population surviving on less than a specific level of income per day.
Nevertheless, altering the poverty une by just a few units can significantly change
the picture we get of poverty in a country. Furthennore this indicator telis us very
little about how people experience poverty in different regions and among
different populations. Hence, the use of this indicator can resuit in a systematic
underestimation of poverty, due to the inaccurate conversion rates in purchasing
power parity, the aggregation of data from rural to urban areas and fmally, the use
of national household surveys which have proven to be highly inaccurate ami
tended to hide inequalities wiffiin households (Vandennoortele 2004, 3).
The continuous reliance of this indicator demonstrates the development industiy’s
attachment to the traditional and prevailing poverty reduction theoiy which is
based on the alleged elastic relationship between economic growth and poverty
alleviation. This theoiy fails to acknowledge that poverty constitutes above all a
human phenomenon which is rooted in numerous factors, many of which are non
income, such as food insecurity, civil strife or conflict, lack of land ownership or
enviromnental degradation. The income-based definition of poverty fails to
address the multi-dimensional character of poverty which can manifest itself in
different ways such as lack of access to essential services, decreasing quality and
quantity of employment, lack of coping capacities among the poor, social and
economic dislocation, political disempowerment, environmental degradation,
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gender gaps, increased cbfld mortality etc. Hence, many question whether
absolute poverty is the right target.
Moreover, even though the MDGs are strong on the material aspects of
deprivation, tliey do flot take measures conceming participation, democracy and
governance, ail of which constitute key elements of the Millennium Declaration
that are strongÏy advocated by civil society groups in “developing” countries.
Furthermore, they do flot address issues such as reproductive health or job
creation. Hence, one could agree that the MDGs oversimplify poverty and the
objectives of development. For this reason, many consider the Goals to be a
simplistic, incomplete approach to poverty reduction and step backwards for
human development. Therefore, these factors must be considered when
developing indicators for absoiute poverty.
Furthermore, critics argue that the Goals demonstrate the industiy’s Iack of
political will and commitment in tackiing the structural causes of poverty. The
IFIs and the U.N. seem too attached to the neo-liberai policies that characterize
the post-development era (Focus on the Global South 2004, 7). Unfortunately
international development agencies and donors are unable to critically analyze
how these policies confribute to the entrenchment of poverty. Therefore, one
must question if the MDGs go further than past international development goals
or are they a mere continuation of the “same old, same old”.
On the other hand, numerous critics underline the fact that there is a basic
contradiction between poverty eradication and the narrow application of growth
oriented development strategies (Focus on the Global South 2004, 7). The
prescription for economic growth shifts attention away from local endowments
and internai economic capacities, hindering the adoption of policies that can
address extreme poverty. Most of the studies concentrating on poverty reduction
have been limited to the calculation of how much economic growth is necessary
in order to alleviate poverty over a given time (Focus on the Global South 2004,
10). Even though the link between growth and poverty reduction remains
controversial, it lias been widely accepted that growth alone wiii flot produce the
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trickle-down effects it previously assured16 Paradoxically, the Goals, which are
allegedly based on a human development vision, have flot detached themselves
from the growth-driven model which continues to dominate the development
industry’s discourse. Here lies an enormous contradiction; whfle achieving the
Goals requires investments in social sectors such as health and education, the
traditional neo-liberal model emphasizes a reduction of state expenditure for the
benefit of fmancial stability. The development industry has failed to address these
contradictions, nor establish the preeminence of development as freedom rather
than growth for development.
The Millennium Development Goals were bom out of a Declaration that was
founded on fundamental human nghts. Nevertheless, the Goals themselves seem
to be adopted in support of the traditional neo-liberal vision of development which
is sfrongly detached from the belief that life without poverty is a right, ensured in
international human rights law and UN Declarations. In sum, for the MDGs to
truly tackie the roots of poverty, they must address issues such as agranan reform,
redistribution of wealth, enhanced public services, food secunty, labour rights as
well as essential gender guarantees. They must go far beyond the traditional dollar
—a —day benchmarks and address the issues concerning the distribution of political
power, such as participation.
MDG$: forging a global partnership
It is frequently asserted that the Millennium Declaration, which was adopted by
147 Heads of State and 189 Member States, constitutes the most significant
partnership established by the international community over any given set of
quantitative and time-bound development goals. The development industry
considers the MDGs a global compact, based on shared values, goals, and
responsibilities that have been established by the UN Charter and the Millennium
Declaration (Katsianouni 2005). The Declaration highlights both global and
national responsibilities that were later reaffmned at the 2002 international
meeting in Monterrey, (Monterrey Consensus) where low-income countries were
16 Refer to McGillivray (2005), Easterly (2003) and Erixon (2005).
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exhorted to improve their policies and high-income countries were asked to fulfihi
MDG8 by providing better aid and opening up access to their marketst ‘.
At the international level, the MDGs are allegedly based on sustainable
partnership among international actors. This partnership emphasizes the
importance of govemance and committing to resource mobilization, equitable
frade and debt cancellation. At the national Ïevel there are governance
requirements such as ensuring democracy, human rights, the mie of law,
participation, inclusiveness and accountability (Katsiaouni 2005) ail of winch
constitute an end and a means for achieving the MDGs. An innovative form of
partnership at the national level involves the active participation of civil society
organizations in adopting development objectives, such as poverty reduction. Tins
type of partnership will be discussed in the next chapter on the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers. At both levels, these partnerships are often less productive or
conducive to change due to inequitable market conditions and weak negotiation
capacity of low-income countries, winch is strongly linked to the unequal power
relations present at both international and national level. Right now, we will
focus on partnership at the global or international level, as called for by the 8th
MDG. Our evaluation ofMDG8 is concemed with determining whether the Goals
have accomplished important advances in creating an international economic
policy environment favorable to the achievement the MDGs and to reaching the
goal of poverty reduction.
Tme partnerships are characterized by a relationship based on equity, respect and
national ownership. According to the development community, the term global
partnersinp for development implies an alliance in the fight against poverty,
through the aid, trade and debt-relief relationsinp between donor governments and
“developing” countries. It conditions donor commitment to more development
fmance and greater flexibility in use of resources to country commitment to
poverty reduction and good govemance. Even though the pinlosophy is flot new,
it marks an important shifi in approaches to development. Tins approach implies
For more on the Monterrey Consensus, consuit Zia Qureshi,and James Boughton « From Visionto Action”. Finance and Development, September 2004 which is availabte at www.imf.org
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that development is flot just about income growth, it is also about self
determination, and self respect.
While the first seven goals address the progress ffiat needs to be achieved in the
different dimensions of human development, MDG8 commits high-mcome
countries to a global partnership for development, based on a fairer trade system,
debt relief, technology transfer and an increase in aid flows. Goal 8 is about
creating an enabling international environment in which national poverty
reduction strategies can succeed (Watkins and Amadi 2004). Furthermore, this
goal acknowledges that external, exogenous factors are influential on growth.
Experts know that MDG8 is of extreme importance for achieving poverty
reduction and reaching development goals. Moreover, MDG8 is the only goal that
covers international relations. International factors have become extremely
important in national development as a resuit of the potent globalization process.
“Developing” countries have become more integrated in the world economy and
their economic performance is highly dependent on the international economic
environment.
Unfortunately, this goal is flot effective in holding the influential players
accountable. The weaknesses around this goal are another indication of how high
income countries lack the political will for accepting change and tmly pnoritizing
poverty reduction. In contrast with the first seven MDGs, the 8th seems to be a
mere statement of good intentions, rather that a clear commitment for action. It is
the only MDG without time-bound or quantffied indicators. Behind the rhetoric,
one can easiïy observe that Goal 8 is flawed by its inferior nature, compared to
that of the other Goals. for example there is no time-bound target for reducing
trade barriers or agricultural subsidies, even though there are numerous targets
that could be used. Second, the same effort is not put into producing reports on
progress for these targets whereas there is a great amount of reporting being done
on the indicators of the first seven Goals. Neither the World Bank nor the OECD
web sites for the Millennium Development Goals report on these indicators
whereas they do numerous reports on indicators for the other Goals (Watkins and
Amadi 2003). The UN has established special projects for helping countries
defme national strategies, monitor progress, and for campaigns advocating the
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realization of the MDGs and mobilizing ail stakeholders (Watkins and Amadi
2004). The lack of global monitoring of Goal 8 demonstrates that high-income
countries will flot be held accountabie for the success or failure of the MDGs,
while low-income countries are being monitored and held accountable for their
gains as well as for their failures.
The implementation of MDG8 could constitute the first step towards achieving
policy coherence between current development discourse and fundamental areas
of public policies. Nevertheless, successful and sustainabie poverty reduction
efforts require suitable policies at the international level. Globalization has
rendered low-income countries, especially those which are highly reliant on
bilateral and multilateral institutions for aid, bans and debt relief, increasingly
dependent on the global economic order and international policies. Therefore, it is
essential that the development community acimowiedge the significance of
creating a favorable policy environment for encouraging development
effectiveness. Hence, policy coherence should be considered a prerequisite for
achieving the Goals. In the context of the Millennium Development Goals,
especially MUGi, counfries’ performance towards reaching the Goals depends
not only on domestic policy choices but on global economic structures and
policies. It creates necessary incentives and generates effective synergies across
different sectors, elements that are not aiways present in “developing” countries or
at the international level.
There are evident contradictions and a lack of coherence between the goal of
eradicating poverty and the policies promoted by donors and international bodies
which oflen go against important UN conventions on deveiopment, thereby
undermining commitment to the MDGs and the creation of a true global
partnership. Although UN agencies play an important robe in promoting and
implementing the MDGs they are unable to effectively influence the global
fmance and trade regimes in reforming into a more just and equitable system. On
the contrary, the U.N. lias moyeU towards reforming its own approacli to make it
coherent with Bretton Woods Institutions.
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Despite some debt refonn initiatives, ffie weight of debt repayment and service
continues to diminish low-income countries’ capacity to tackie poverty. The
MDG fails to commit the international community to debt cancellation, even
though this would constitute a great investment for reaching the Goals. To date,
the only commitment that high-income countries have made is to increase aid
flows. However, flot rnuch has been donc to reform it. Increased aid without
necessary refonns could imply increasingly centralized conditionahty as well as
dependence on macro-economic prescriptions pushed forward by the IFIs. Over
the last five decades, donors have used ODA to further their national interests.
These interests have usually overshadowed recipient countries’ poverty reduction
objectives by cutting public expenditures on sectors crucial to human
developrnent. MDG8, while addressing the importance on increasing the quantity
of aid, fails to address the significance of improving its quality.
We do not argue that foreign aid cannot play a valuable role in poverty reduction.
Nevertheless, the development industry should seek iimovative and creative ways
for increasing the financial resources available to low-income countries. The
MDG8 merely pushes for increases in ODA, without addressing the numerous
possibilities that exist in recurring to other aid sources. for example, many civil
society organizations have called for a tax on foreign exchange transactions at the
global level, or the Tobin Tax proposed by the Association for the Taxation of
Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC). Moreover, aid flows
could corne from other sources, such as a tax on arms trade or an environmental
tax on the use of carbon. To this regard, a study commissioned by the U.N from
the World Institute for Development (Sandmo 2003) considers a global
envfronmental levy; a carbon-use tax applied at a rate of 4.8 US cents a gallon.
This tax would be applied to high-incorne countries and could lead to around 60
sus billion a year.
On the other hand, one cannot question the importance of trade for development.
In the reaim of trade, liberalization continues to be ifie creed by which the
“developing” world must abide. Although the international community
acknowledges ifiat international commerce is an essential source of economic
growth, many low-income countries continue to be deprived of its benefits due to
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inequitable practices, such as U.S. and European subsidies in agriculture.
Furthermore, MDG8 does flot defend a countiy’s nght to choose its own approach
to liberalizing its trade and economic system. Consequently, countries are flot free
to use domestic trade as an instrument for shaping national development. The
importance the MDGs have given to the volume of aid tends to promote a “charity
approach” to poverty reduction, sidelining the significance of reforming
international financial, commercial and political structures. In the past, rhetorical
commitments have failed to dismantle the trade barriers and implement
comprehensive debt relief programs (Watkins and Amadi 2004). The MDGs will
fail to establish global partnership if equity remains absent in multiple economic
and political relations that have an impact on development.
A global partnership for poverty reduction can take many forms, but to date, it is
manifested through foreign aid or ODA (Vanemoortele 2004). As one can
observe, even though the language of Goal 8 sounds like a breakthrough in past
development discourse, the reality of actions in trade and debt do flot match up to
the rhetoric. High-income counbies retain the upper hand and are not taking the
adequate steps to fuffilling their commitment for achieving the MDGs. It is highly
important that high income countries accept their obligation and responsibilities in
the war against poverty.
Furthermore, at the macro level, decisions on poverty reduction policies and
action plans must seek the consultation of civil society prior to implementation.
Poverty reduction cannot be addressed in a sustainable manner unless
govemments and civil society work together and fmd ways in which they can play
critical and complementary roles. It is well known that the MDGs were created by
a senior level UN conference and flot actually inspired by civil society. At the
micro level, development projects must seek the majority endorsement of the
populations affected prior to their approval. Many civil society networks working
at the grassroots level are flot familiar with the MDGs (Focus on the Global South
2004, 7). It is important to question how meaningful the MDGs are to ifie poor
and to what extent they provide incentives for their participation since the targets
seem to be too remote to respond to the urgent needs and problems of the p0or.
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The MDGs do not offer a comprehensive analytical review of poiicy reform and
mstitutional change. If high-income countries do flot align their policies with the
industry’s poverty reduction objectives and cooperate in creating a just
international economic and political environment favorable to development, the
Goals will flot be achieved, and sustainable progress will flot be realized.
For there to be a true global partnership for development, the international
community needs to accept ffiat “developing” countries have the right to take a
pragmatic approach towards “selectively” integrating their domestic economy
with the global economy (Khor 2003, 4). This consensus should be the foundation
for the international trade, fmance, investment, and aid systems, as well as the
system for international property rights. Without a different approach at the
global level a frue global and equitable partnership will neyer exist.
Conclusion
Throughout the years, organizations such as the World Bank and the U.N. have
put a great deal of effort and invested a large amount of resources searching for
the next big idea that will allow aid to buy growth or at least revitalize the system
in the process. The MDGs seem to constitute a new attempt at rejuvenating an
industry that has suffered from large failures and a loss of credibility. The
development community continues overselling the efficacy of aid and the MDGs
are playing a vital role in this process by making the case that poverty can be
eradicated with the right amount of resources.
It is essential that the MDGs provide a greater emphasis on the quality of
processes and not just the quantity of outputs, prioritized by the target-oriented
approach. furthennore, the MDGs must flot become a new conditionality that
binds governments to donor set international targets rather than their national
pnorities. The Goals address many areas concerning human development;
nevertheless, they do flot take measures conceming participation, human rights
and democracy, ail of which constitute key parts of the Millennium Declaration.
furthermore, the MDGs ignore issues of democratic governance and the need to
strengffien civil society. Hence, development inputs need to accord a greater
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consideration to structural causes of poverty and acknowledge the limited
potential of aid in achieving long-term sustainable development or meeting
international development goals. The MDGs should serve as an example of the
type of outcomes that the development community should strive for. But they
should flot overshadow important issues such as human rights and inequality.
While the development industry sustains that the spirit of the MDGs is flot to
impose specific targets on each country, one cannot ignore that the Goals have
become the new world-wide development trend. It seems very difficuit for
countries to establish their own development plan without following the industiy’s
new “fad”.
The MDGs do flot constitute a paradigm in development, but benchmark
indicators of how the developing world is advancing in the areas of human
development and socialleconomic rights (Fukuda Parr, 2003). Hence, the MDGs
are flot a new development strategy, but a new tool for mobilizing action, a global
commitment and a potential framework for accountability. The MDGs are
capable of stimulating new debates about why they might flot be met and what can
be done about it. The novelty surrounding the MDGs is flot due to their content
but to how they have accomplished political consensus on common objectives.
For the MDGs to constitute a real breakthrough in the way the development
industry tackies poverty it is extremely important for MDG8 to be translated into
a clearer time-bound commitment, pressuring high-income countries to align their
policies in key areas. If flot, the gap between the industiy’s rhetoric and their
practice will remain enormously wide, and development will fail to be
sustainable. Today, MDG$ constitutes the key element to achieving the
Millennium Development Goals. Nevertheless, MDG8 fails to address the
imbalances and power relations present in international structures. Furthermore,
ifie development community must address the contradictions that exist between
applying a systematic approach to poverty reduction and adhering to the
traditional ideology based on liberalization.
There is a certain level of consensus that the MDGs are about ends, but there is a
great deal of disagreement on the means that should be employed for reaching
these Goals. Numerous civil society organizations demand that the development
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industiy go further beyond the MDGs. Some sustain that development institutions
should treat them as if there were an occasion to achieve improvement rather than
a charter for development. Nevertheless, most agree that the MDGs must be based
on a wider framework of values and principles present in UN Conventions on
economic, social, economic and cultural rights.
Nevertheless, not ail is negative. The urgency that the development community
now feels conceming the achievement of these goals demands increased
investments in areas conceming poverty reduction. This in tums gives civil
society the leverage for ensunng that the development industiy and high-income
countries address numerous issues, such as beffer aid, debt forgiveness, equitable
trade etc.
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Chapter 4: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: a Pro-Poor
Agenda or Structural Adjustment in Disguise?
Introduction
Since its beginning, development assistance lias been driven by political,
economic and institutional concems from both donors and recipients. Pushed by
their different political and institutional environment and donor’s organizational
culture, both actors have engaged in an aid system ifiat has been charactenzed by
a Yack of consensus on how to pursue poverty reduction and development.
Recipients have and continue to be higffly dependent on the fmancial resources
offered by the development industry while donors face organizational demands
for ensuring their survival (Dante 2002, 6).
Following the failure of structural adjustment programs, two concepts have
dominated the industry’s discourse: aid effectiveness and poverty reduction.
United Nations’ specialized agencies such as UNICEF and UNDP are considered
the precursors of this new shift, as they had already demonstrated their awareness
of the rismg incidence of poverty in developing countries by denouncing the fatal
effects of SAP policies, specifically, the large increase of foreign debt. For the
Bretton Woods Institutions’, the frustrating resuits of structural adjustment
strengthened their conviction that national recipient governments’ policies were
the most important determinant of aid’ s ability to produce growth and poverty
reduction’8. Today, development rhetoric has changed and traditional
conditionality has been substituted by country selectivity and ownership.
Furthennore, the development community is allegedly pushing for a new
partnership based on a more equitable relationship between donor and recipient
govemments.
One of the central foundations for this approach is the World Bank’s and IMF’s
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper around which ail future extemal fmancial
18 For more information, consuk David Collar and Lant Piitchett, « Assessing Aid: What Works,What doesn’t and Why?» World Bank, 1998.
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development assistance, including debt relief would be coordinated. They replace
Policy Framework Papers prepared between the IMF, World Bank and recipient
governments for concessional bans. The Bretton Woods Institutions affirm that
PRSPs constitute a new approacli for tackiing ffie problematic issues surrounding
poverty reduction and economic development in low-income countries. The PR$P
is based on three main innovations: its focus on poverty reduction, its
participatory process for policymaldng and monitoring which links the donor
community with national stakeholders and its aim at achieving better coordination
and coherence of ODA and ail funding for achieving the MDGs (ding,
Razafmdrakoto and Roubaud 2003). While the MDGs constitute a normative
framework with moral imperative, the PRSP is a pragmatic policy instrument
backed by economic power (Comwall and Brock 2005).
Today, there seems to be a consensus among donors. Ail ODA flows to low
income countries are channeled through PRSPs. However, this bas raised many
questions within the development community. Has the content of the development
industry’s policies really changed? Or lias structural adjustment been camouflaged
into PRSPs? What are the implications for this new emphasis on aid effectiveness
and donor coordination? Are the PRSPs capable of changing the way the industry
tacides poverty or does this change constitute a way to ensure that the industry
operates in the same way with the exact ideological bias? Above ail,
acknowledging ifiat the BWIs are the authors of this new initiative, wliat are the
implications of having the largest “for profit” organization in charge of the
business of eradicating poverty? These are some of the questions we will attempt
to answer in this chapter.
The birth of the PRSPs
In 1999 ifie World Bank and IMf made its new war on poverty operational by
launching the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Under this joint initiative, low
income countries applying for extemal financial aid or debt relief from either of
the institutions would be required to prepare and submit poverty reduction
programs. Both IFIs adapted their aid programs in order to include poverty
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reduction as a main goal. Henceforth, the PRSPs would be the key instrument for
providing development assistance in terms of grants and bans.
The IMf and the World Bank have invested a large amount of human and
fmancial resources in the implementation of this new approach in order to assure
its success. The devebopment industrys major donors have decided to follow the
BWI’s lead and link their aid to the PRSPs. The fact that ail ODA ftows to low
income countries are chaimeled through these new international poverty reduction
strategies is remarkable. This constitutes a major change, notably in terms of
donor coordination, in an industiy frequently criticized for the lack of coherence
and duplication of its initiatives.
The enormous mobilizaflon and channeling of efforts demonstrates the power, and
hegemony of BWIs over low-income countries and within the development
industry. Their central role in global policy-making and governance give PRSPs a
leveraging role far vaster than debt relief and concessional credits. PRSPs
constitute the main policy instrument through which the principal donors of the
development industry relate with low-income countries. Given ah the resources
ifiat have been mobilized and the consensus that lias been reached among donors,
the success or failure of this Initiative will have a large impact on the future of
international development assistance.
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Figure 4: the key characteristics of PRSPs
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According to ding, Razafmdrakoto and Roubaud in New International Poverty
reduction Strategies (2003), three factors pushed the Bretton Woods Institutions
to launch the PRSPs. The first influential factor was the rising incidence of
poverty in the developing world. Continuous economic failure in several
developing countries, specifically in Affica, put in doubt the efficiency of past
development policies. For example, if the figures for China are flot included,
statistics show ffiat poverty had risen in the last two decades, specifically in Sub
Saharan Africa and Central Asia. Furthermore, the number of least developed
countries has also doubled in the last 3 decades (Cling and al. 2003, 4).
Consequently, the development industiy has acknowledged that urgent action
must be taken to reverse these trends. The adoption of the PRSP as a policy
instrument is a direct response to current concems with aid efficiency.
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The second factor is the failure of $APs and the questioning of the Washington
Consensus and their three- axed solution: macroeconomic stabilization, internai
and external liberalization (ding and al 2003, 4). It is well documented that the
failure of structural adjustment policies has led to an immense multilateral debt
crisis and has had an adverse socio-economic impact on societies in the
“developing” world. After almost two decades of recommending these policies,
the BWI cannot refer to a single country case where these programs have been
successful.
The third is the crisis in the legitimacy ofBWIs. For the World Bank and the IMF
the PRSPs constitute the perfect remedy to this problem. This factor is directly
related to the first two, given the consequences of their past approaches in
numerous “developing” countries and the aid fatigue they produced. The
efficiency of development aid was fiercely questioned throughout the 1 990s,
contributing to the decrease of fmancial contributions by donors. The shift in the
IFI’s rhetoric constitutes an attempt to restore their legitimacy as well as the
international community’s faith in development aid. Furthermore, they also
constitute a means for addressing civil society’s harsh criticisms. It is evident that
the BWIs were forced to follow the UN’s lead on poverty reduction and make it a
central part of their agenda. Hence, one cannot assume that the ideological
baggage that came along with SAP has suddenly vanished. Nevertheless, we must
flot quickly disregard PRSPs as being a mere repackaging of past structural
adjustment policies. Before making such an assumption, we must explore the
implications of PRSP implementation and thefr role in achieving the Millennium
Development Goals.
The content ami underlying principles of the PRSPs
The emergence of PRSPs mark an evolution in the Bank’s thinking on aid. Today
the Bank acimowiedges that the impact of aid on growffi is only positive in the
presence of good policies. Traditional conditionalities based on future reforms are
inefficient. The release of aid flows is 110W conditioned to the results obtained and
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ffie quality of policies pursued’9 (Cling and al 2003, 222). The BWIs have
understood ffiat aid is far more ftmgible than imagined and that the allocation of
resources through project aid is illusory or unsuccessful. Finally, the development
industry acknowledges that differences between “developing” countries,
specifically in terms ofthe quality of policies and institutions, must be considered.
On the other hand, in numerous low-income counfries PRSPs are becoming the
operational frameworks that translate MDG targets into action. PR$Ps are
supposed to establish the short and medium-term operationai targets required for
achieving the Millennium Development Goals. They should lay out the changes in
domestic policy needed to attain these international targets. Country ownership,
govemments’ commitment and donor coordination have the potential of opening
spaces for dialogue and bringing MDGs more concertedly into policy debate
(Vandemoortele 2005). furthermore, they are considered to be the overarching
framework to ensuring that the Goals are on target and thefr main monitoring
device.
In theoiy, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers must be prepared by recipient
govemments through broad participatory dialogue and under the supervision of
the IMf and the World Bank. They should identify the poor, the incidence and
causes of poverty, and design strategies for alleviating poverty. The PRSP’s
creators underline that poverty reduction strategies must be country driven, resuits
oriented or focused on outcomes that benefit the poor, comprehensive in
recognizing the multidimensional nature of poverty, partnership onented and
based on a long term perspective (World Bank, 2002). PRSPs should serve as an
action-planning tool for accelerating poverty reduction, with time-bound targets
and costing estimates.
Principles
The PRSPs are based on several principles, some of winch are higlily political20.
first of ail, there is the principle of country ownership, which can be a very
As stated previously in Chapter 2, aid conditionality has been extended to the political reaim.
° The World Bank’s incursion into the political realm goes back to emergence ofthe «goodgovernance » concept at the end ofthe 1980s.
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ambiguous concept. This principle should involve donors supporting and funding
govemment-led expenditure plans reflecting national needs and subject to national
accountability (Cox and Haidan 2003). When analyzing World Bank and IMF
sources or other donor documents, it seems that the concept “country ownership”
refers to more than ownership by government actors. National consensus, which
would be a prerequisite for country ownersbip is a highly political debate that
technocratic institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF are flot prepared to
engage in.
Then there is the principle of participation that will be discussed in detail later on.
It is flot clear what participation truly means. It seems to suggest that
govemments should facilitate technical consultations with selected local
stakeholders. But, who detains the power and the legitimacy to participate and in
what processes? Which stakeholders will be prioritized? These issues have flot
been deeply discussed by the BWIs or bilateral donors. Should these institutions
be involved in such higffly political processes, or are these beyond the PRSP’s
reach. PRSPs are also built on the principle of equal partnership between actors,
specifically between govemments and donors and government and civil society.
Partuerships imply a consensual form of policy-making among relatively equal
partners (ODI 2004,5). Yet this conception does not take into consideration the
strong power imbalances that exist between these actors, such as the fact that
donors have the upper-hand when dealing with recipient govemments.
Another underlying principle is the notion of comprehensiveness, which requires
that macroeconomic frameworks converge with poverty reduction goals. Tins
requfrement demands a certain level of institutional capacity, considering how
challenging it is to develop coherent and comprehensive strategies. Tins principle
also requires state legitimacy and the auffiority or ability to implement policies in
a consistent manner.
finally, lilce the Millennium Development Goals, PRSPs should be resuits
oriented and explicit on the poverty reduction goals they aim to achieve. They
should also focus on establishing long-term goals, a somewhat difficult task in
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countries with unstable political environments and a weak commitment to long
terni objectives which do flot have a strong political appeal.
Content
Ail PRSPs are expected to contain the main elements, considered by the Bank and
Fund to be the essential to poverty reduction. According to previous World Bank
board papers, PRSPs should include the following five factors (Kiugman 2005).
Box 4: PRSP’s Five Key Elements
PRSP’s Five Key Elements
• An assessment ofpoverty and its key determinants
• Specific targets for poverty reduction
• Prioritized list of public actions for poverty reduction
• Systematic monitoring of poverty frends and an evaluation of the impact o]
govemment policies and programs
• Description of the main aspects of the participatoiy process
The World Bank and the IMF sfrongly underline the importance of country
ownership and the fact that PRSP content should depend on local context.
Nevertheless, the Institutions demand that countries defme a national sfrategy for
development that focuses on the following themes: macro and structural policies
for growth, improving govemance, appropriate sectoral policies, realistic costing
and appropriate funding (Kiugman 2001). Sound macroeconomic policies
continue to be viewed as a precondition for growth. National macroeconomic
frameworks must ensure a level of inflation that does not limit private sector
growth, economic growth consistent wiffi poverty reduction objectives and a fiscal
position that is compatible with PRSPs growffi and poverty reduction objectives.
The standard macroeconomic framework is based on keeping the size of the
public sector at a strict minimum. Consequently, public investments are Iimited,
since they are viewed to push out private investment. PRSPs should present a
series of fmancial stabilization measures, such as reduced public deficit, fiscal
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reform, monetaiy control etc. They should also develop structural reforms
designed to facilitate market mechanisms and favor growth. These reforms
include liberalization, privatization and promoting private sector growth. As one
can observe, PRSPs have an economic content ffiat is mainly determined by the
Bank and the fund21, more specifically the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility22.
On the other hand, in many developing countries, present govemance structures
and public sector management constitute a critical obstacle to effective poverty
reduction. Hence, PRSPs are expected identify how govemance and budget
arrangements can be improved (Kiugman 2003). Issues such as, the Yack of
govemment transparency and accountability, fragmented budgets and poor civil
service performance must be addressed. Up to date, most PRSPs have identified
measures to combat corruption, improve public sector financial management and
institutional refonns such as decentralization and civil service reform.
Moreover, PRSP must also review important sectoral policies and programs and
design reforms in healffi, education, social protection rural development,
infrastructure and the environment (Kiugman 2003, 19). Strategies in these areas
should work towards combating sources of inefficiency and inequity in the
delivery of basic services and the inequalities in the distribution of public
spending. Moreover, PRSPs are expected to evaluate whether the private sector
should play a larger role in service delivery. Counfries should also address cross
sectoral linkages and thefr effects on poverty outcomes. These include linkages
between the envfronment and poverty (ex. the health impacts of natural resource
degradation).
21 For exampie, in Nicaragua, the World Bank and the IMF have conditioned bans to the
privatization of the countr’s water resources. This move cornes in response to the legislation
passed by the Nicaraguan National Assembly in August 2002, halting ail water privatization plans
until a national debate is held. This conditionality constitutes an attempt on national participatory
and democratic processes in Nicaragua (Mekay, 2002).2 The PRGf is an IMF iending facility established in 1999 which provides a new economic
conditionality ftamework targeting macroeconornic stability, privatizations, and tradeliberalization.
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PRSPs should also address the realistic costing of ail government expenditure
programs, such as poverty reduction initiatives and their consistency with the
macroeconomic framework. Realistic costing requires that authorities make a
selection of priority actions across sectors and that ffiey judge which will have the
largest impact on poverty reduction. These priorities should then be integrated
into the macroeconomic framework and ifie budget (Kiugman 2003). PRSPs must
appropriately estimate the costs of the programs that make up the strategy. Ibis
process is important for ensuring that expenditure programs for poverty reduction
are adequately funded.
Finally, the PRSP must provide a well defmed action plan and a precise calendar
that prioritizes measurable objectives. Donors believe that goal-setting constrains
recipient governments to develop concrete poverty reduction programs and pushes
them to honor their responsibilities, thus, increasing accountability. The 2000/01
WDR enumerates the goals that must guide the defmition of poverty reduction
policies. The outputs of these policies must include facilitating the access of the
poor to “opportunities” and resources by increasing spending on basic social
services, promoting ffiefr “empowerment” and participation through
decentralization measures, increasing access to information and offier
participatory processes. Finally poverty reduction policies should aim to increase
“security” by creating insurance systems, facilitating the poor’ access to credit
and ensuring food security (ding and al 2003, 182).
The BWIs provide policy advice on fiscal management, structural, institutional
and sectoral reform, budgetary targets and expenditure priorities throughout the
stages ofpreparation ofPRSPs. A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies23
is available to guide countries in preparing PRSPs. The Sourcebook includes a
collection of broad policy guidelines, examples of international best practice and
technical notes for more technically oriented readers (Kiugman 2003).
Preparing countiy-owned participatory PRSPs will take time. With the intention
of avoiding delays in the provision of concessional lending or debt relief, the
BWIs have decided that countries can prepare Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy
23 The PRSP sourcebook is available online : v.wortdbank.otg
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Papers24 ffiat would be less demanding in content. furthennore, for the first time,
efforts were made to consuit recipient countries’ govemments, civil societies and
private sector through ifie organization of international, national and regional
seminars (ding and al. 2003, 1). World Bank personnel are involved in Joint
Staff assessments that are mandated to ensure that fmal PRSPs can be presented to
the Boards for approval. The staff must decide whether the nationally prepared
document provides what the BWIs eau a credible framework for desigrnng their
programs of concessional assistance (World Bank, 2001). Given ifie important
role that the Bank and fund occupy in formulating PRSPs, it is difficuit to accept
that the PRSPs are really counby-driven.
On the other hand, the PRSPs have tended to neglect the impacts of inequality at
the macroeconomic level and their effects on poverty reduction. The concept of
social inequality has rarely been addressed by the World Batik. Combating
inequality seems to be considered as a means and flot an end. Most experts and
researchers in the field continue to believe that faster economic growth can 5e
linked to faster poverty reduction. However, economic growth has to 5e combined
with a certain form of redistribution for poverty reduction strategies to be
successful in combating and alleviating poverty (Bourguignon 2002). Achieving
elevated increases in growth does not necessarily translate into the alleviation of
poverty. While economic growth can lead to improvements in social indicators, it
does flot address ifie question of equity and redistribution. The Bank’s and Fund’s
focus on growffi remains based on the triclde-down ffieory which has been higbly
discredited during the last decades. Jan Vandemoortele states:
“High inequality is flot only harmful for the poor, it also inhibits economic
growth; delays policy refonns and entrenches special interests. Thus, equity is
good for the poor because it is good for growth. Growth alone is flot the answer;
only when the poor participate in, contribute to and benefit from economic
growth will it make a measurable and lasting dent on human poverty” (UNDP
2003, 15)
Unfortunately, up to date most PRSPs do not extensively address the question of
inequalities and redistribution. When the subject is addressed, most countries use
24 I-PRSPs are available online : www.worldhank.org
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the concept “disparity” instead of inequaÏity and they rarely use the word
redistribution25. By emphasizing that growth is the main driver for poverty
reduction; PRSPs implicitly turn away from any active redistribution policy
(ding and al 2003). Furthermore, ffie PRSP approach does flot adequately address
the negative impact ffiat may corne with rapid growth, such as urban congestion,
rural migration and environmental degradation (Guttal and Chavez 2003). This
constitutes another atternpt by the BWIs to remain an apolitical organization, by
avoiding as much as they can any conflict of interest.
Some also question to what extent PRSPs take into account a broader concept of
poverty and ifie implications of the new multi-dimensional nature of the concept.
f irst there is the question of which dimension of poverty should be prioritized.
For the rnost part, monitoring indicators focus on monetary poverty, health and
education. The MDGs also constitute an example of this tendency. The lack of
participation in political processes and respect for human rights are not prioritized
as essential instruments for combating poverty. Generaliy, PRSPs do not address
the antinomies and conflicts between the goals of growthlmacroeconomic stability
and democracy/respect for human iights. Moreover, most PRSPs fail to address
the impact of the international envfronment of poverty reduction. In most cases,
ifie only measures that the poverty strategies make reference to can be reduced to
the traditional pursuit of liberalization and limited support for export promotion
(ding and al 2003). The concept of governance seems limited to the reaim of
domestic affairs, specifically to issues such as corruption and administrative
inefficiency.
Hence, one could easily question wheffier PRSPs really prioritize poverty
reduction. Concrete and realistic poverty reduction strategies focusing on precise
social sectors are often lacking (ding and al 2003). The PRSPs preparation
process seerns to be limited to enumerating a large list of recommendations for
actions to be taken. Furthermore, most PRSPs fail to establish a ranidng of
priorities. Countries are subject to numerous obligations that do not promote an
environment for developing policies according to priorities. Above ail, countries
25 Bolivia can be considered an exception. Their PRSP does mention these terms. The Bolivian
PRSP is available onhine at www.woddhank.org
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must fulfili IFI’s demands for financial stability, macroeconomic growffi, security,
and empowerment.
Thus, an important question imposes itself: to what degree are the PRSPs a simple
recycling of past policies? Despite the fact ffiat one of the PRSPs principles is
country ownership, most proposed strategies are relatively uniform, thus implying
that govemments do flot take into account their local context and individual
conditions. Most Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers look astonishingly similar in
content, even for countries that are dealing with different problems and local
contexts. If the PRSPs were genuinely countiy-led and inspired, ffiey should be
more heterogeneous. Such homogeneity can 5e linked to the PRSPs
conditionalities. Its supporters believe that PRSPs have moved away from specific
policy conditionalities, towards process conditionality in hopes of adjusting
unequal power relations between donors and recipient countries (Piron and Evans
2004). However, macroeconomic policies in PRSPs do not seem to be much
different to those prescribed by structural adjustment. The international
development community therefore faces a strong homogenization process, which
is reinforced by the PRSPs donor coordination capacities. This process, constrains
low-income countries desiring debt relief and fmancial aid to adjust their poverty
reduction strategies to BWIs demands.
furthermore, the ownership principle is threatened by the standardized, blue-print
framework of the poverty strategies, the strong time constraint, high demands of
capacity and the fact that the PRSPs are ultimately adopted by BWT boards26. The
BWIs have enforced thematic as well as methodological conditionalities. The
Bank and the IMF have basically defmed the content that should 5e present in
PRSPs, therefore hindering the development of endogenous ideas. Like SAPs,
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers bind recipient governments to implement
Bank-Fund directed polices as conditions for receiving support from donors.
Experience in Asia, Africa and Latin America has shown that country
govenments have little control over the content, structure and policy prescriptions
in their respective national PRSP document, thus questioning the principles of
26 Idrissa Dante (2002) cites the Malian proverb: «la main qui donne est au dessus de celle qui
reçoit.» (Translation: The hand which gives is above the one which receives.
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ownership. The BWIs conditions carry more weight than national laws in
countries higffly indebted who do flot have any access to alternative sources of
fmance (Guttal and Chavez 2003). With ffiese conditions, it will be very difficult
for true ownership and empowerment to thrive and flourish. for there to be
genuine ownership, recipient govemments must initiate reform programs
ffiemselves. When a reform program is guided by a predefined agenda, ownership
is problematic.
Henceforth, low —inc orne countries desiring debt relief must defme a home-grown
development strategy in une wiffi BWIs neo-liberal ideology. The negotiating
power of national authorities remains higffly limited compared to that of their
donor “partners”. As one can see, ffie PRSPs principles of ownership are highly
antithetical wiffi the BWIs use of conditionalities. The means of intervention of
the BWIs remain dependent on the use of coercion to a large degree (ding and al
2003, 160).
Like the structural adjustment policies that preceded them, PRSPs emphasize that
macroeconornic stability constitutes the primordial prerequisite for poverty
reduction. Seeking financial stabilizafion while simultaneously ensuring the
investments necessary in social sectors eau be a very challenging endeavor.
Structural reforms aimed at liberalizing and opening national economies remain
the major priority of Bretton Woods Institutions. PRSPs continue to focus on
medium to long-tenu benefits for growth, failing to address the negative impacts
on the living condition of the poor in the short-tenu (ding and al 2003, 186).
This demonstrates the IFI’s tendency to presume that liberalization will
necessarily benefit the poor and the lack of discussion or openness to other
alternatives.
Monitoring and evaluation in the PRSP process
Policy monitoring and evaluation is one of the main weaknesses in PRSPs. The
unreliability of statistical systems in low-income countries constitutes a major
limitation for effectively monitoring poverty reduction policies. Tins situation is a
result of a lack of technical capacity, the low diffusion of available data and a
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quasi-inexistent level of funding from the domestic budget. Generally, countries
depend strictly on donor funds for ffie production of performance surveys,
strengthening even more ffie low degree of ownership (Cling and al 2003, 215).
Even ffiough poverty reduction policies have been implemented by low-income
countries, they have rarely been monitored or efficiently evaluated. This is due to
the state of their statistical systems which are in ruins and consequently fail to
provide the general public with economic and social information. furthermore, in
most cases, statistical data is not available, is incomplete or irrelevant to the
immediate needs of decision-makers and civil society. Ibis implies that the
diagnoses made in the PRSPs are generally based on unreliable data (ding and al.
2003, 270). Disaggregated data by regions, demographic groups and by gender
are also lacking. Moreover, quantitative data is rarely accompanied by extensive
qualitative information, limiting ifie analysis of the resuits. Most analyses simply
observe the scale of poverty but are unable to underline the factors that could be
used to defme poÏicy. Since monitoring and evaluation systems are usually weak,
assessing the growth and distributional impacts of past policies and programs
becomes extremely challenging. This type of evaluation is essential for improving
strategies over time.
In order to redress national statistical deficiencies, the international development
community developed the PARIS21 Initiative (PARtnerships in Statistics) in
1999. This initiative aims to reinforce the technical capacities of low-income
countries to gaffier and analyze statistical data, in order for indicators to 5e
adequately monitored. Nevertheless, donor provisions of massive amounts of
technical assistance to compensate the lack of technical and analytical capacities
increase recipient countryTs dependency on aid.
As one can observe, human and fmancial limitations in low-income countries vi11
affect the quality of results. Even though the preparation of PRSPs constitute an
opportunity for rehabilitating efficient information gathering tools, the time
constraints for completing them do not encourage inquiry into the current
system’s weaknesses and faults or thefr sustainable reconstruction.
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Furthermore, the reshaping of developing policies to include the newly accepted
multi-dimensional definition of poverty poses an exceptionai challenge to national
statisticians, who are in charge of monitoring and evaluating policies. Henceforth,
statisticians must employ methods to ensure poverty measures and analyses
support the defmition of anti-poverty strategies. M&E systems must also provide
real-time monitoring of changes in population’s living conditions in order to
assess die impact of reforms, to evaluate the effectiveness of policies and to
establish the adjustments that are necessary. Finally, statisticians must ensure that
information is effectively disseminated, allowing ail of society’s stakeholders to
play a part in decision-making and in evaluating policies.
For there to be true ownership, the choice of indicators must strongly depend on
each counby’s poverty reduction objectives. It should therefore resuit from die
identification of needs and priorities, allowing information to be used effectively
(ding and ai 2003, 271). Hence, M&E systems shouid consider local capacity
and existing human and financial resources.
The implications of donor coordination and aid efficiency
Aid effectiveness is a fundamental issue when making the case for higher aid
volumes. Today, die MDGs and die PRSPs are exerting a growing amount of
pressure to improve die efficiency and effectiveness of development aid. As die
development industry acknowledges the challenges of reaching the MDGs,
attention has become increasingly focused on the need for developing
management strategies for enhancing die achievement of outputs and results.
Donors are focusing on fmding ways to build countries’ capacity and demand for
results-based approaches, on die need for development agencies to offer
coordinated support, and on harmonizing approaches to results measurement,
monitoring and management (DAC 2003). The development industiy has also
begun emphasizing tEe importance of developing results-focused corporate
cultures.
Among donors and deveiopment agencies, there is a widespread belief that
improving die effectiveness of aid constitutes a key way to achieving poverty
94
reduction and hence reaching the MDGs (de Barra 2005). There is a consensus
that donor coordination is an essential instrument for improving aid efficiency.
The Monterrey Consensus, arising from ffie 2002 International Conference
Financing for Development, stated ffiat donors should “hannonize their
interventions behind counfry-owned poverty reduction strategies.
. .to make aid
more effective” (United Nations 2002, par.43).
One of the reasons that PRSPs have become highly popular is the fact that they
promote better coherence between donor interventions. The objective of the
PRSP approach is to coordinate ail donor efforts and make ifiem more efficient
and transparent for recipient governments. PRSPs are also considered a valuable
instrument for harmonizing donor initiatives towards the recipient government’s
own development agenda. Jeni Kiugman states:
it is envisioned that PRSPs will be the primary instrument by which a country
articulates a strategy around which external development partners could align
their own programs of support” (Kiugman, 2003,6).
The concept of donor coordination has gained importance because the
development industry has acknowledged that reaching the MDGs will requfre
doser coordination among donors with panner countnies. Furthermore, the
formulation of PRSPs requfres that donors coordinate their development
cooperation contribution and align them with the comprehensive concept
established in the papers (German Development Institute 2004).
Donor coordination: what and why?
Donor coordination and aid reform have been popular recurrent themes since the
1980s. Tins is largely due to the fact that the aid system has faced a great deal of
cniticism over the last two decades because of its ineffectiveness in terms of
delivery and resuits. Aid effectiveness, winch is the main stake of donor
coordination, will require that donors and recipient govemments convert rhetonic
into practice. Furthermore, it is important that aid coherence be based on
ownership and partnership, putting recipient countnies in the driver’s seat. Up to
date, the development industry’s responses to these issues have focused on the
semantic of these concepts rather than on practice and on aligning thefr
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instruments to existing national procedures (Dante 2002). To this effect, Tony
Killick (2000) affirms ffiat past experience has demonstrated that many obstacles
to national ownership are due to donor practices and the imbalance of power in
the donor-recipient relationship. A culture of patemalism has aiways marked this
relationship, making coordination of donor activities by countries higffly difficuit.
As higfflighted earlier, ifie Yack of ownership is also exacerbated by the assumed
lack of technical expertise in developing countries which limit its capacity for
elaborating thefr own poverty reduction strategy according to their national vision.
In most low-income countries, so much time is invested in responding to donor
conditionalities, monitoring and evaluation procedures, making recipient
govemments more concemed with donor processes, rather than investing time and
resources on their own priorities.
What is donor coordinatioWharmonization? The German Development Institute
defines donor coordination as an agreement among donors with the aim of
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of development cooperation (German
Development J.nstitute 2004). It requires the alignment of donors with partner
countries based on the principles of ownership, alignment and
coordination!harmonization (aid effectiveness pyramid). According to the
Overseas Development Institute for the DAC Working Party on Aid
Effectiveness,
.harmonization relates to increased coordination and streamiining of the
activities of different aid agencies. . .“ (ODI 2005, 9)
Harmonization is based on three principles (ODI 2005):
Box 4.1: three principtes of harmonization
3 principles of harmonization
• Establishment of common arrangements for planning, managing and delivering aid
• The simplification of procedures and requirements from donors
• Promoting transparency and increasing coordination through the sharing o:
information
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The concept of aid coordination or harmonization, when employed in a more
general sense, includes ffie notions of aligiunent and ownership, which asserts that
efficient partnerships for poverty reduction and development require that donors
follow these principles. The DAC conceives harmonization and alignment as a
three-phase process aiming to increase aid efficiency. This process can be
presented in the form of a three-level pyramid seen below:
Figure 4.1: Aid Effectiveness Pyramid (OECD,DAC 2005)
Alignment
H arma n izati on
Country ownership of poverty reduction strategies and policies is a key to
achieving effective and sustainable development outcomes. Partner governments
must assume a leadership role in setting ifie development agenda and aid must be
delivered in accordance to thefr priorities. Another essential requirement for aid
effectiveness is the alignment of donors’ aid programs to country priorities. The
Pans Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) states that donors must commit to
align behind govemment-led strategies and if this is not possible, they should tum
to country, regional, sector or non-govemment systems. The PRSPs are allegedly
based on these principles. Finally there is the harmonization of donor procedures,
which, as stated earlier, involves simplifying procedures and donor requirements
by establishing common arrangements for planning, managing and delivering aid.
Nevertheless, generally, donors bypass govemment procedures because they
believe govemment systems and institutions to be weak and inefficient. By totally
Ownersh ip
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ignoring govemment systems, donors perpetuate developing countries incapacity
to manage aid effectively (De Barra 2005). Unfortunately, most harmonization
efforts focus on coordinating procedures raffier than aligning behind country
procedures and priorities.
The pyramid can be read in a top-down or bottom-up manner. If the process is
top-down (according to the pyramid), recipient countries begin by preparing their
strategy for achieving their own poverty reduction objectives and donors support
them by aligning to these strategies. At these two levels, capacity building and
institutional development are crucial. In the last phase, donors cooperate with
each other and establish common simplified procedures and exchange
information. On the other hand, if the process is bottom-up, donors coordinate and
harmonize their techniques and have a greater influence in the preparation and
implementation of national development strategies. At ail levels of the pyramid, a
focus on resuits is emphasized; countiy-led agendas must be oriented towards
growth and the poverty reduction goals it aims to achieve. Unfortunately, past
expenence demonstrates that the process is more likely to occur in a bottom-up
manner. Conditionalities are even more powerful when imposed in collective
manner, thus increasing the power of donors in an already higffly asymmetrical
donor-recipient relationship.
So, why push for aid reform and coherence? The German Development Institute
(2004) states that donor coordination is crucial due to the proliferating number of
donors in the development industry. The international development industry
currently has 37 bilateral donors and some 30 multilateral donors (German
Development Institute 2004). This multiplicity of donors increases transaction
costs of development cooperation for donors and partner countries and allegedly
diminishes the impact of development cooperation. Numerous sfladies, such as the
2003 DAC Needs Assessment Survey, have confirmed that the principal burden of
developing countries was donor driven priorities and procedures. In this case
donor coordination could help lower transaction costs that emanate from the
preparation of development projects, their implementation, monitoring and
evaluation. These costs could be lowered by reducing the multiplicity and
diversity of activities through the harmonization of donor procedures (German
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Development Institute 2004, 2) The DAC has calculated that a typical African
country has to prepare around 2,400 quarterly reports to different development
agencies (OECD, DAC 2004). If recipient governments are relieved of having to
respond to multiple donors’ numerous mechanisms; ffiey will have more time and
resources to develop thefr own approach according to ffieir own concems.
Uncoordinated aid flows in low-income countries higlily dependent on aid and
with a lack of national leadership in aid management ah contribute to hindering
good govemance and institutional development. Coordination can also prevent
recipient governments from tying ffieir limited capacities in multiple accounting
and reporting mechanisms of different donors.
Nevertheless, for donor coordination to be effective, donors have to accept that
ffieir role is to empower recipient counfries to develop thefr country-owned
poverty reduction programs prior to interaction with donors (Dante 2002, 3). Tins
will help to break ifie control that donors have over developing countries.
Furthermore, donor coordination that is beneficial to low-income countries will
depend on the establishment oftme partnerships, where donors accept countiy-led
development strategies and empower recipient governments to design and
implement these strategies in an inclusive manner. Incoherence among donors has
encouraged aid to be driven by dono?s own priorities, which in tum hinders real
partnership.
Implications of donor coordination
What does donor coordination imply for recipient countries? What does it imply
for country ownership and how does it modify ffie power relations between donors
and recipients? Skeptics have underhined the risks ffiat greater cohesion mask: an
alignment of all donors behind a strategy defmed and implemented by BWIs
without the consultation of recipient countries and ffieir national stakeholders.
Thus, an allegedly democratic and participative process would become
authoritarian by denying a space for pluralism, and the articulation of alternative
strategies to poverty reduction. Donors, by channeling all their resources through
PRSPs are able to ensure that low-income countries are unable to fmd alternative
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policy advice and fmancing for poverty reduction (Guttal and Chavez 2003). If ail
donors become integrated into one unique framework, controlled by ffie BWIs
which have and continue to impose a development vision based on
Washington Consensus, the space for debate and political arbitration will be
limited. Furthermore, bilateral donors risk lining up with the BWIs and their
macroeconomic conditionalities, leaving the principles of ownership far behind.
As one can observe, donor coordination or harmonization can serve as a tool for
donors, enabling them to retain considerable control of the development process
of countries receiving their aid (Reality of Aid 2004). The GDI underlines that
donors can therefore be more efficient in persuading partner countries to accept
structural reforms.
On the other hand, the new requirements for enhanced donor coordination may
unintentionally imply a greater load for an already overcharged and under
resourced public sector. Govemments risk being overwhelmed by new demands
involving the redesign of audit and monitoring and evaluation systems. Hence, at
the end, the transition from the traditional way of managing ODA to the new
method dictated by donors will probably put more stress on countries in terms of
the resources needed for establishing a more coordinated procedure for managing
aid.
Moreover, the GDI points out the danger of ail donors acting erroneously in a
coordinated fashion, hence producing disastrous resuits. If several donors pool
their contributions in the form of budget aid and it is not used efficiently because
of recipient countries inadequate planning, implementation and monitoring
capacities, the effects may be highly negative. Tins type of argument implies that
donor coordination may not be effective for low income countries with limited
monitoring capacities.
PRSPs have been predestined to become the primary instrument for coordination
between donors and national stakeholders in recipient counfries. But, will donors
base thefr alignment on thefr patiner countrys national development strategies or
will recipient countries be forced to implement donor policies and agendas? If
donor coordination is to be effective, it must not overtax the partuers’ ownership
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and capacity by imposing donor methods. Donors can assist partners by
providing technical assistance wiffiout over-aiding or reducing incentives for
partners’ to make efforts on their owri.
Finally, effective coordination demands willingness on the part of donors to
participate in donor-donor and donor-partner dialogues (German Development
Institute 2004). They must voluntarlly put ffieir interests last if donor coordination
is to be successful. But is this possible? Donors each have ffiefr personal interests
and their own agenda. It may be a littie idealist to believe that they will set thefr
interests aside, especially when ffiey are accountable to the tax payers and citizens
of their respective counfries. Considering the unbalanced power relations
currently present in the donor-recipient relationship, it is important to question if
and how donor coordination might shift these power relations. Previously,
recipient countries had some influence, being able to play donors against each
other to their convenience, but with donor coordination more power might be
shifted to the donor side. Concerning the MDGs, donor coordination implies
concerted efforts on achieving the Goals, but what if partner recipient countries
have other priorities. In this case, ffiey risk flot being addressed. If donors and
recipient countries were equals in their partnership, donor coordination could 5e
higffly promising and effective.
As one can observe, aid effectiveness is flot solely a technical matter, hence it
should flot be limited to actions focusing on ifie harmonization of procedures.
Behind ifie premise of aid inefficiency due to lack of coordination and coherency
between donors, also lies the issue of power within the donor-recipient
relationship and a western development vision that lias been imposed as being the
only model for achieving poverty reduction. One cannot deny that uncoordinated
aid and the multiplicity of procedures are hindering the effectiveness of aid.
Nevertheless, the deveiopment industry must address how most donors subjugate
aid to their own interests and their conception of development. Aid effectiveness
demands a radical transformation of the goals of officiai development assistance
and allocation methods. Above ail, ODA must provide support for national
policies and strengthen local abiiity to deveiop public policies that promote
poverty reduction.
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The PRSP’s principle of participation and partnershïp
One of the prerequisites that the PRSP have to fulfihi is that they should set up
participatory processes for developing poverty reduction strategies. Participatory
processes imply the active involvement of national stakeholders from ail sectors
of society in the design, implementation and monitoring of poverty reduction
strategies. In this regard, the PRSPs constitute an attempt to confer democratic
legitimacy on policy reforms. The traditionally top-down, authoritarian and
centralizing approach to economic deregulation and policy reform has proven to
be ineffective in producing long-term poverty reduction over the years.
According to J.D. Naudet (2003), the increasing emphasis on the role of civil
society underlines a shift from “national particularism” to “plural affiliation”. He
daims:
“The duty for solidarity by aid institutions is being addressed less and less to
states, and more to individuals and civil institutions. The result is the
‘humanitarianization’ of development aid as the frontier between the two poles of
intervention becomes less and less clear” (Naudet 2003, 223)
In the past, foreign experts played a large role in defming recipient countrie&
national policies and in the case where these policies where subject to negotiation,
low-income countries possessed narrow margins for maneuver. Information
available to citizens was highly limited and most documents used for negotiations
were confidential. Nevertheless, the development industiy’s past experiences have
proved that policy-reform does not succeed without local ownership and
stakeholder participation. Donors have acknowledged the importance of
understanding the socio-political, cultural, institutional as well as economical
context of recipient countries.
The PRSPs attempt to take into account these lessons and respect the principles of
ownership, empowerment and accountabiity. The principle of ownership
emphasizes that participation is an affair of the state; therefore, governments
should be strongly committed to ensuring the role of civil society in the defmition
and the monitoring of policies. In turn, empowerment aims to give the poor the
opportunity to influence policies that have a large impact on their condition.
Hence, participatoiy processes should contribute to ameliorating the quality of the
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political debate and to the defmition of a poverty reduction strategy efficient in
meeting the poor’s social needs (ding and al. 2003, 152). Furthermore,
participation implies that all stakeholders are welcomed to discuss govemment
policies. Apart from donors and recipient govemments, the large panoply of civil
society should be involved in the process. This refers notably to vuinerable groups
of society such as the handicapped, the young, women and indigenous groups, as
well NGOs, community organizations, trade unions, academic institutions and the
pnvate sector.
But what do the IFI ‘s mean when they use the term participation and who should
be involved? The World Bank defmes participation as:
“The process through which stakeholders influence and share control over
priority setting, policy-maldng, resource allocations and access to public goods
and services. There is no blueprint for participation because it plays a role in
many different contexts, different projects and for different purposes” (Tikare,
Youssef, Donnelly-Roark and Shah 2001, 3).
li is important to point out that the IMF and the World Bank do flot explicitly
specify whether the participative process will be solely of a consultative nature, or
if it wili include decisional power. For the most part, participation does flot
inciude input in fmancial programs or macroeconomic planning. The defmition of
participation is often an interpretation of the organizationai culture defming it. It
lias often been characterized as a means and an end and is viewed as a necessary
process for correcting the power imbalances that characterize development
initiatives and practices. Nevertheless, there is flot any consensus over whether
participation is appropriate in ail development interventions.
On the other hand, the World Bank does not cleariy defme the term “civil
society”. However, it believes that three elements are essential for ensuring
effective civil society participation at the national level. First of ail there is
iegitimacy of the civil society representative, which must be recognized by the
public as being so. Secondiy, the group must represent the interests and the needs
of its constituency. f inally, the civil society representative must have the
organizational and analytical capacity necessary to realize its objectives (Tikare
and al. 2003). Generally, NGOs are considered to be the only representatives of
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civil society even if they often lack ffie legitimacy, capacity and
representativeness (ding and al 2003, 171). The World Bank views the private
sector as being a stakeholder and an independent group/actor, while other
institutions view it as being part of civil society.
The BWIs evaluate the degree of participation by focusing of the following
elements: participatory processes within govemments, national civil society
involvement, support from bilateral and multilateral development partners, the
presence of mechanisms for consulting the poor and plans for dissemination the
PRSPs (Cling and al. 2003, 155). Nevertheless, these do not constitute clear and
detailed standards for evaluating the quality of participation in the preparation of
PRSPs.
The PRSPs principle of participation implies significant changes in the way
national affairs are managed. The new international poverty reduction strategies
favor the right to information and expression, tackiing one of the key
manifestations of poverty, exclusion and marginalization (ding and al. 2003, 14).
This principle has the potential of addressing the lack of democratic institutions in
“developing” countries. It should redistribute power, benefiting civil society
organizations in decision-making, implementation, monitoring and assessing
policies. This process also has ifie potential of increasing state accountability
before its citizens.
Neverffieless, participation is a higffly political process and its impact will depend
on local context. Most development organizations remain hesitant to what they
believe is “political aid”. Many practitioners continue to believe that poverty
reduction strategies and development programs are politically neutral. The truth is
that the development endeavor has proven to be a highly political enterprise.
Implementing the principle of accountability, empowerment and ownership, risks
creating multiple conflicts of interest within civil society and between other
national stakeholders. The Bretton Woods Institutions have not addressed these
risks or identified any instruments for dealing wiffi this problem. Up to date, the
World Bank and the IMF have identified themselves as being apolitical
institutions, and have therefore attempted to avoid entering the political arena.
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Since the IFIs are limited by ffiefr economic mandate, they cannot directly engage
in purely political reforms such as democratization. By pushing for participation,
they inevitably enter highly politicized territoiy. However, their incursion is
limited, since the PRSPs do flot take into account conflicts of interest, the need for
mediation and the implications for the state. Donors have to consider that
govemment ownersbip does flot translate into citizen ownership and vice versa.
Furthermore, participatory approaches imply that the exercise of decision-making
power at the local level is as legitimate as it is at the national level (Jennings
2000). Tins leads us to question if the idea of a participatory process remains a
utopian ideal.
Furthermore, the political nature of tins process and the lack of attention given to
ifiese issues, risks producing two unintended outcomes. On the one hand, there is
the risk that those exercising the greatest power at the national level (the elite)
impose their point of view on politically weaker stakeholders. Tins implies that
these less powerfiul groups will have to conform to a mere consultative role in the
process. On the offier hand, in attempt to avoid conflicts of interest, govemments
may be enticed to avoid and ignore difficult and socially divisive issues during the
participatory process, making poverty reduction strategies less effective (ding
and al 2003, 173). The participatory process of the PRSPs creates democratic
demands in “developing” countries that the IMF and the World Bank, as apolitical
institutions, refuse to address. On another hand, the insertion of extemal donors
between civil society and national govemments risks debilitating the influence of
local CSOs in setting national priorities and rendering govemments more
accountable to donors raffier that to their citizens.
Furthermore, how will donors ensure that representatives from the poorest levels
of society are included in a participative process? Usually the poorest and most
marginalized groups in society are not sufficiently organized to be influential in
policymaldng. For the ‘most part, participation has been limited to consulting
prominent and well resourced NGOs on pre-prepared documents. furthennore,
why should the national govemment feel accountable to intermediate, unelected
institutions that are not subject to any procedure ensuring representativeness?
Civil society’s ability to participate in decision-maldng will depend on their
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access to information. In various countries, initial PR$P and Interim PRSPs are
flot translated into local languages until the fmal stages of preparation, hence
exciuding local input during ifie formulation process (Chavez and Guttal 2004).
furthennore, it is flot participation if the purpose is to engage local populations
and civil society in order to convince them of the legitimacy of a program or
action plan ffiey took no part in creating.
Moreover, the lack of technical capacity in many low-income countries means
that frequently donors and external consultants end up being the ones preparing
the poverty reduction strategies. Veiy often, donors appoint several international
consultants specialized in sectoral issues in order to fil in capacity gaps. Tins
poses great problems to the principle of ownership and empowerment. Donors
and partner countries must establish measures for training and provide technical
and financial support to associations. Hence, it is essential that local technical and
institutional constraints be addressed and dialogue between the different
stakeholders be guaranteed in order to assure that the principles of participation,
ownership and accountability are upheld.
The PRSPs also confer an essential role to the state. SAPs were aimed at reducing
the role of the state through internai and external economic liberalization. On the
contrary, poverty reduction strategies daim to reinforce, at least rhetorically, the
role of the state and its autonomy in defming and applying economic policy.
Furthermore, PRSP make national govemments the pilot and leader of the
participatory process. The BWI efforts to rehabilitate the state have raised
opposition from those who consider that the state should no longer be viewed as
the center for policy formation.
The emphasis that is placed on participatory process has resuÏted in a confusion
concerning the responsibilities of the state. After almost two decades of “less
state” philosophy one must question if it has the capacity of assuming tins role.
The development industry must address the need to reinforce ifie state, in light of
its new responsibilities. Institutional and organizational capacity constraints and
elevated costs of managing and mobilizing the large panoply of national
stakeholders constitute large obstacles to the sustainability of the process.
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Moreover, in order for the state to efficiently assume its new responsibilities
under the PRSP process, it is important that it obtain greater autonomy in
managing extemal aid flows. The impact of these changes wili depend on the
quality of public institutions in recipient countries.
As one can observe, the development industry is increasingly emphasizing that
solutions to poverty must be reached through partnerships with recipient
govemments and local stakehoiders. These partnerships must be characterized by
a more equitable relationship between donors and recipients countries.
Unfortunately, there is no consensus on what partnership really implies or who it
involves. Is WB approach to partnership supposed to focus on building a strong
relationship with the State or with civil society and other local non-state actors?
In sum, PRSPs have the potential of faciitating more inclusive public debates and
dialogues on policy-making, but this by itself will not ensure that polices will be
aimed at achieving pro-poor outcomes (Vandemoortele 2004). IINDP studies on
the agency’s role in the PRSP process found that there was liffle correlation
between the degree of participation and the policy content of national PRSPs
(UNDP 2003). Furthermore, while the consultations and open dialogue ifiat the
PRSPs promote between low-income countries and donors constitute an
opportunity for important debates on national poverty reduction strategies, these
occasions must flot tum into a routine of compliance with mies and
conditionalities associated with the technocratie issues surrounding aid. Structural
reform and organizational learning is essential if organizations such as the World
Bank are to truly adopt sustainable “people first” participative approaches. One
must therefore question whether the organizational imperatives of the
development industry will create a space for implementing true participative
methodologies in the design and realization of poverty reduction strategies.
Conclusion
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers have the potentiai of facilitating a more
balanced reiationship between donors and recipient countries. However, the
development industry’s new rhetoric mises several contradictions. First of ail,
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policy dialogue between donors and recipient countries is not devoid of
conditionalities. On the contrary, conditionalities are stili present in the PRSP
framework. Today, they concem above ail, the outcomes of poverty reduction and
not just measures to be adopted. Critics sustain that poverty is being used as an
alibi with the objective of ensuring the reproduction of neo-liberal economic
model in low income countries. The influence that the IFI’s have in the defmition
national poverty reduction strategies policies is exercised tbrough thefr attempts to
improve aid efficiency. This overarching objective represents de facto new ways
for imposing economic conditionalities.
Most PRSPs present a policy framework very similar to the one prescribed during
the structural adjustment era. The influential players of the development industiy
continue to believe that growifi is the panacea to poverty and that macroeconomic
stability, financial regulation, and trade liberalization are its prerequisites
(Vandemoortele 2004). Poverty reduction continues to be perceived as “an
automatic by-product” ofeconomic growth (Vandemoortele 2004, 18). Hence, not
much lias changed in practice, and on the industry’s views on development. We
are witness to an evolutionaiy rather than a revolutionary process which involves
participation and dialogue with national actors and stakeholders, at least in
rhetoric (Booth, Mosely 2003).
Donors assume that since PRSPs are meant to enforce the principle of shared
ownership among different national stakeholders, pro-poor commitments will
necessarily be addressed. Nevertheless, low-income countries face numerous
institutional constraints which limit the quality and success of this instrument.
furthermore, the ambiguity concerning the arbitration of conflicts of interest, the
confusion surrounding the new role of the state, the lack of attention paid to
inequalities and redistribution, together with the capacity gaps in monitoring,
reflect the weaknesses of PRSPs and ffiefr uncertain future. Consequently, the
PRSP’s emphasis on pverty reduction and participatory processes risks being of
a marginal influence in future development programs.
Through the PRSPs, one can once again wituess the World Bank’s capacity to
mobilize the development community around the frameworks ifiat it designs. Not
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much has changed in the modus operandi of the Bretton Woods Institutions,
despite their newfound commitment to poverty reduction. Unfortunately more
than fifty years of practice makes it difficuit for an organization or an industiy to
change their behavioral pattems, despite ail good intentions. However, flot ail is
negative; some winds of change are blowing. Today, the development industry’s
discourse acknowledges that if aid is to be more effective, it is important that
recipient countries possess ownership over their policies and poverty reduction
strategies etc. However, there is a long distance from rhetoric to practice.
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Conclusion
Past failures in ffie development endeavor and the aid fatigue that ffiey produced
have consequently led to the adoption of a new set of normative and alternative
concepts (jartnership, ownership, accountability etc.) but have flot translated into
a change in the underlying ideology and practice. The new rhetoric surrounding
development assistance suggests a profound shift in aid relationships and ffie
distribution of power among actors. Nevertheless, it falis short of producing real
change, rather it reveals a process whereby alternative development concepts have
been conceived and incorporated into the mainstream in a process of hybridization
between alternative and orthodox discourse (Pieterse 199$).
In 2001, Brock, Comwall and Gaventa stated:
“This process, whereby dominant narratives are constantly reshaped by their
absorption of elements of counter-narratives, has given rise to the articulation of
new variants that appear to offer a convergence of competing agendas, recasting
elements of older approaches in an evocative new story-line that appears to have
appeal across the board. Orthodox approaches have continued to propound a
foundational narrative in which economic growth is the solution to development
reducing poverty through trickle-down of the benefits of growth (Brock and al.,
2001).
At the end of this analysis, we are led to the conclusion that there has flot been
significant change in terms of practice as a resuit of the implementation of the
NPA. The New Poverty Agenda and ah its instruments appear to be an attempt to
diffuse criticism and attack by appropriating its opponent’s main tenets and
terminology. The present discourse is repackaged and reinvented to such a degree
that it is able to appease actors and numerous critics with different ideological,
and political backgrounds, thereby reducing pressure for fundamental change and
at the same time, guaranteeing the survival and reproduction of old orthodoxies
and ideologies.
Hence, even with the appropriation of alternative and normative concepts,
development practice is stiil dominated by the quest for growth through macro
economic stability, hiberalization and privatization. It has adopted this rhetoric in
view of assuming the legitimacy to intervene in “developing” countries.
Ho
Dominating IFIs continue adopting processes lilce the PRSPs that are IMF/Bank
owned and operate with minimal inputs from recipient govemments and even iess
from civil society. Despite the evolutions in development discourse, the same
model and paradigm is being promoted and the MDGs and PRSPs are being
supported because they do not fiindamentally go against this modeL
Technocratic and apolitical agenda
Moreover, the development industiy’s new discourse on poverty reduction is
based on a fictional, apolitical environment where ail stakeholders have the same
capacity and influence in decision-making. This conceals the imposing power
asymmetries present in today’s aid regime. In the past, but increasingly within the
last two decades, poverty reduction lias been transformed from a political
endeavor, relying on structural change and redistribution, to a question of global
management techniques. The MDGs and the PRSPs demonstrate the manner in
which poverty reduction has become a depoliticized management project, void of
important issues such as power, equality and redistribution. This new agenda
transforms poverty, a political problem, into a technical one by associating it with
scientific knowledge and management and therefore legitimizing political action
in the process (Storey and al. 2005).
Nevertheless, we have observed that poverty reduction is a highly political affair.
It involves shifting relations of power, providing access to state resources and
altering legislative frameworks in order to ensure greater opportunities for the
poor. Poverty alleviation will necessarily create winners and losers in the process
and numerous conflicts of interests to be deait with. Cunent policy instruments
and frameworks have treated this issue as a triviality, contributing to the
ineffectiveness of numerous initiatives.
Development practitionrs need to address the implications of power in thefr work
and relations wiffiin their own organizations and their partners. It is essential to
understand how power is exercised when shaping the discourse behind policy
processes. Today development discourse and practice continues to be molded by
powerful actors in the “developed” world. Since most donors and development
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agencies follow World Bank guidelines, hegemony over discourse limits
alternative debates and perspectives27. Intermediaiy organizations such as NGOs
can also address the ways in which power influences thefr work and partnerships
and therefore leam to negotiate and refuse aid conditions that undermine thefr
autonomy (Hinton and Groves 2004, 140). Civil society and community based
organizations can study diese power structures and use this Imowiedge to build
alternative sources ofpower (Chambers and Pettit 2004, 141).
Organizational imperatives and learning
Unfortunately, the organizational imperatives of development agencies (the
primary one being suniival) go against die mission of developing autonomous
local processes. These organizational imperatives are sfrongly woven into the
power dynamics that exist within the donor-recipient relationship.
Despite the strong external consensus on die importance of organizational change
within organizations such as the Bank and the UN, diverging demands among the
multiple actors and stakeholders hinder the possibility of achieving a coherent
reform strategy, produced from the outside (Leiteritz and al. 2005). The
organizational requirements and overali culture of institutions such as the World
Bank and the UN, characterized by “approval culture” and “disbursement
imperatives”, have prevented die development industry from responding
efficiently to evolving demands and priorities. Furthermore, they have created a
dependency on universal, technocratic blue-print models that are unsustainable
and have failed to achieve significant advances in poverty reduction. This
organizational culture limits die extent to which reform efforts within die
organization translate into deep behavioral shifts and fiindamental changes in the
underlying ideologies, norms and values diat dictate its practices.
An organization’s ability to change and evolve depends upon die capacity of its
staff to leam and envision change. Katherine Pasteur and Patta $cott-Villiers
(2004) argue that the gaps between language and practice can be closed through
developing new forms of leaming. The objective of organizational leaming is to
27 In order fora discourse to possess a hegemonic quality in Gramsci’s terms (1971), it must move
beyond contests over meaning to unquestioned acceptance (Cornwall and Brock, 2005).
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create the environment for rethinking basic organizational principles and values
(Chambers and al. 2004). The problem is that generally, most aid organizations do
flot have the incentives to implement such internal learning processes. Most
businesses possess far greater incentives to satisfi their immediate customers than
development agencies possess to meet the needs of the poor (Chambers and al.
2004, 151). for example, NGOs are often far more accountable to thefr donors
than to their clients, the people they aira to help. Furthermore, aid organizations,
unlike businesses, usually survive despite the impact, consequences and resuits of
their initiatives. Hence, there is little encouragement for development agencies to
facilitate learning from below, since upward accountability28 has assured
organizational survival and perpetually reproduces ifie status quo or
organizational adaptation.
Closin thoughts
Up until now, the New Poverty Agenda and the adoption of MDGs and PRSPs
constitutes an adaptation sfrategy implemented by the leading players in the
development industiy in order to ensure the reproduction of a development model
that lias not worked to the advantage of “developing” countries. Donors continue
blaming thefr unsatisfactory performance on inefficient management practices
raffier than looking to the inherent flaws in ffiefr strategies and approaches.
The aid industiy has continuously searched for the “right” formula or meffiod for
achieving development. Nevertheless, this attachrnent to blueprint thinking and an
engineering model has kept it from producing any long-terni advances. After five
decades of efforts, it lias become crystal clear how complex development is.
Nevertheless, practice continues to entail the process of systematically
engineering change by controlling variables and incentives, removing constraints
and setting timeframes in hopes that through these actions countries will climb out
of poverty traps and achieve modemization. Even though experience has taught
28 Upward accountability or accountability upwards usuafly refers to recipient govemments, CSOs
being accountable to donors, If Is etc. It can also refer to NGOs being accountable to their donors.
On the other hand, downward accountability usually refers to donors being accountable to their
clients or beneficiaries.
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us ffiat development is flot easily measurable or quantifiable in any reasonable
timeframe, development agencies continue applying these meffiods in practice.
The arrivai of the MDGs and PRSPs at ffie top of the New Poverty Agenda
demonstrates once again that procedures and models for change continue to be
based on reductionist paradigms that fail to view development as a complex
system (Hinton 2004, 210). Furffiermore, we can observe that planning continues
to be viewed as a predictable process where certain inputs produce resuits in
specific time-frames. The PRSP is another example of how the industry’s
technical agenda dominates and overshadows the important political issues
surrounding poverty reduction and leaves them unaddressed.
The past development agenda in which structurai adjustment dominated discourse
and practice has mutated into ifie New Poverty Agenda’s PRSP. The poverty
analysis presented in PRSPs is flot of a structural nature, ifie issues concerning
redistribution, of resources, income, human capital and power are not addressed
by this policy instrument (Comwall and Brock 2005). Furthermore,
methodological innovations such as donor coordination and participation have
been added to achieve legitimacy; however the underlying neo-liberal agenda stiil
remains unchanged. Andrea Coruwail and Karen Brock affirm that:
“They focus the gaze of development’s civic audience on the centre of the state,
where the PRSP consultation circus is being enacted in the services of a benign
set of goals, firmly framed in an assimilated, yet foreign, language of moral
imperative. Watching this show-speculating on what PRSPs might offer
development via their intended and unintended consequences-helps us forget the
street outside the theatre, the world outside, and the action backstage. (Coruwali
and al. 2005, 13)
Participation has legitimized the PRSPs rather than challenge this new
development project. We are witness to participation without change,
consequently reinforcing power relations by failing to address its politics. PRSPS
exemplify a continuous, technical and depoliticized agenda, valued for being
unthreatening to deeply entrenched interests. It renders poverty reduction, a higffly
political issue, into a low-risk technical endeavor. lnstead of building new
partnerships and realizing genuine participation at ail levels, the impiementation
of PRSPs adds yet anoffier conditionaiity on recipient countries without increasing
their capacity to change the global context that is highly influential to their ability
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to reduce poverty. Moreover, the totalizing nature of the PRSP policy model bas
become deeply rooted, consequently creating a “there is no alternative” mentality
and limiting ifie capability of imagining other kinds of policy approaches. We are
in need of an alternative analysis of poverty, one which addresses its political
nature and focuses on inequality, redistribution and political and social exclusion.
This thesis concludes that on its present path and form, the NPA risks becoming a
missed opportunity in ternis of realizing real change and achieving progress in
poverty alleviation. The NPA fails in terms of genuine change because it does flot
contain a critique of the predominant ideologies, such as structural adjustment,
globalization, and the neo-liberal econornic model, which remain intact despite
this new focus on poverty ($torey, Bullocb and Overton 2005, 31). Economic
growth through liberalization remains tbe key medium for poverty reduction and
emphasis stili lies on stabilization. The NPA instruments (MDGs and PRSPs)
have failed to address the exogenous factors such as trade, fmance and donor
responsibility. Responsibility for poverty continues to be placed on governments
and societies offfie South (Storey and al. 2005, 35).
Nevertheless, a new focus on poverty represents an opportunity for change if
donors are willing to move away from simplistic time-bound targets and closed
consensus which impede a plurality of alternatives, and bave the will to
implement policies that reflect the needs and voices of the poor. Tbe MDGs bave
offered a space for civil society to lift its voice and express other highly important
development concems. furthermore, the MDGs have afready demonsfrated thefr
potential in mobilizing resources for poverty reduction. Tbe New Poverty Agenda
can also provide the leverage that civil society needs for pressuring development
organizations and Northern govemment to move past rhetoric and adopt thefr
principles in practice. One must acknowledge that ifie MDGs have succeeded in
bringing the international community and the development industry together to
focus on the challenges of poverty reduction and the resources needed for
overcoming them.
True participation, ownership and empowerment should flot be viewed as a means
to economic growth but an end in itself. Hence, this alleged new consensus must
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be challenged and debate must be fostered in order for this rhetoric to translate
into effective development practice. Furthermore, a critique and alternative to ffie
present functioning of development industry must be conceived, flot just by
development practitioners ffiemselves but also by the “poor” which are the
beneficiaries ofthis endeavor.
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